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THE END OF AN ERA? FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
AFTER THE 2015 AMENDMENTS
Adam N. Steinman*
ABSTRACT
The recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were the
most controversial in decades. The biggest criticisms concerned pleading
standards and access to discovery. Many feared that the amendments would
undermine the simplified, merits-driven approach that the original drafters of
the Federal Rules envisioned and would weaken access to justice and the
enforcement of substantive rights and obligations.
This Article argues that the amendments that came into effect on December
1, 2015, do not mandate a more restrictive approach to pleading or discovery.
Although there was legitimate cause for alarm given the advisory committee’s
earlier proposals and supporting documents, the final amendments—in light of
their text, structure, and accompanying advisory committee notes—should be
interpreted to preserve notice pleading and a robust discovery process. The
more significant lesson of the 2015 amendments, therefore, may be to confirm
the view that the amendment mechanism of the Rules Enabling Act is unlikely to
generate consequential changes to the Federal Rules (for better or for worse).
The process leading to the 2015 amendments was teed up almost perfectly for
opponents of meaningful access and enforcement to make real, detrimental
changes to federal pleading and discovery standards. Yet the final amendments
ultimately did not do so.
Accordingly, the key battleground following the 2015 amendments will be in
the federal courts themselves, as judges are called upon to interpret and apply
the rules in particular cases. No doubt aware of this fact, Chief Justice Roberts
has taken various steps to spin the recent amendments as making more
significant changes than they actually do. These post-amendment moves are not
legally authoritative and do not modify the law of civil procedure. But the Chief
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Justice and his allies may win the day if they are able to dominate the gestalt
surrounding the 2015 amendments in a way that persuades lower court judges
to take a more restrictive approach. Properly interpreted, the 2015 amendments
do not support the Chief’s narrative. Recognizing this will be crucial for
ensuring access and enforcement going forward.
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 3
I. THE PATH TOWARD PROCEDURAL RECALIBRATION? ........................... 8
A. A Brief History of the Federal Rules ............................................ 9
B. The Shot(s) Heard Round the World: Twombly, Iqbal, and Why
They Matter ................................................................................ 14
C. Initial Steps in the Rulemaking Process ..................................... 17
1. The 2010 Duke Conference .................................................. 18
2. The 2013 Proposal ............................................................... 19
II. REACTION TO THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS ...................................... 22
A. Responses from Attorneys, Judges, and Academics ................... 23
B. Post-Comment Revisions to the Proposed Amendments ............. 26
III. THE 2015 AMENDMENTS: A CLOSE READING ..................................... 28
A. Scope and Proportionality .......................................................... 28
B. Admissibility and Discovery ....................................................... 33
C. Eliminating Discovery’s “Second Tier” ..................................... 35
D. Deleting Examples of Relevant Matter ....................................... 37
E. Protective Orders and Cost-Shifting .......................................... 38
F. Elimination of the Pleading Forms ............................................ 40
G. A Few Words on Interpretive Methodology ................................ 42
IV. BEYOND THE 2015 AMENDMENTS: LESSONS AND CHALLENGES ........ 44
A. Civil Procedure’s Post-Legislative Era ...................................... 44
B. Post-Adoption Developments ..................................................... 48
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 52

STEINMAN GALLEYSPROOFS3

2016]

9/26/2016 8:24 AM

THE END OF AN ERA?

3

INTRODUCTION
On December 1, 2015, a set of controversial amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure took effect.1 The five-year-long rulemaking process
that culminated in these amendments focused most intensely on pleading
standards and access to discovery. These two procedural issues are crucial to the
judicial enforcement of substantive legal rights and obligations because, in many
cases, the evidence and information needed to prove a substantive claim remains
in the hands of the defendant.2 The pleading standard matters because too strict
a standard could create an insurmountable Catch-22: plaintiffs would need courtsupervised discovery to obtain the information needed to get past the pleading
phase, but they could not invoke the discovery process unless they survived the
pleading phase.3 And the scope of discovery matters because—even if a case
gets past the pleading phase—too restrictive an approach to discovery can make
it impossible to obtain the information needed for judicial enforcement to
succeed.4
The rulemaking machinery that led to the 2015 amendments, however, was
not driven by a desire to facilitate meaningful access to the courts or to promote
effective enforcement of substantive rights. Rather, many involved in the
process embraced the all-too-common critique that lenient pleading standards
and the ability to compel one’s adversary to provide discovery invite frivolous
lawsuits, unwarranted litigation costs, and lengthy delays in resolving disputes.5

1 See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE, RICHARD L. MARCUS, A.
BENJAMIN SPENCER & ADAM N. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1007 (4th ed. 2016)
(summarizing the amendments); see also Supreme Court of the United States, Order of April 29, 2015,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15_5h25.pdf (“[T]he foregoing amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall take effect on December 1, 2015 . . . .”).
2 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 589 (1997); Stephen B.
Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1583–85
(2014); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821,
824–26 (2010); Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1263 (2008); Arthur
R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the
Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 288–89 (2013); A. Benjamin Spencer, The
Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 355–56 (2010); Adam N. Steinman, The
Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1311–12 (2010); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth
Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1843–51 (2014).
3 See Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 68 (2010); Arthur R. Miller,
From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1,
42–43 (2010); Steinman, supra note 2, at 1352.
4 See Miller, supra note 2, at 353–56; Subrin & Main, supra note 2, at 1849–51.
5 See infra Section I.C.
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Such criticisms have been frequently debunked as empirically unsupported and
conceptually incoherent,6 but this “cost-and-delay narrative”7 featured
prominently in the conferences, reports, memoranda, and agenda books that
were generated during the rulemaking process.8 It seemed to many, then, that
the 2015 amendments would undermine the simplified, merits-driven approach
put in place by the original drafters of the Federal Rules.
But that is not what happened. Consider, for example, the proportionality
considerations that have been codified in the Federal Rules for more than three
decades. As the current amendments were making their way through the Rules
Enabling Act process, many worried that proportionality would become a more
significant obstacle to discovery.9 In fact, the text and structure of the
amendments that were ultimately adopted—as well as their accompanying
advisory committee notes—do not compel or suggest that federal courts should
balance these considerations in a more restrictive way.10 Likewise, the biggest
concern regarding pleading standards—the 2015 amendments’ elimination of
the pleading forms contained in the rules’ appendix—was mitigated by a
clarifying note stating explicitly that deleting the forms “does not alter existing
pleading standards or otherwise change the requirements of Civil Rule 8.”11

6 See Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionality in Discovery,
50 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 18–19), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2551520; Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60
DUKE L.J. 765, 768 (2010); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (1994); Danya
Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L.
REV. 1085, 1090 (2012); Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2074–75
(2002); see also Miller, supra note 2, at 361 (“[A]ccording to the practicing bar, . . . litigation abuse is anything
the opposing lawyer is doing.”).
7 Miller, supra note 2, at 365 (identifying the “cost-and-delay narrative” and calling it “an enticing elixir,
one that is easily consumed but perhaps one that is lacking in nutritional value”); see also Reda, supra note 6, at
1090 (“The longevity of the cost-and-delay narrative should raise alarm bells because it provides support for
efforts to foreclose access to civil courts and to shift the focus of procedural lawmaking away from the facilitation
of legal claims and the remedying of legal wrongs . . . .”).
8 See infra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
9 See infra Section II.A.
10 Some aspects of the amendments, in fact, place greater emphasis on the need for discovery to avoid
information asymmetries that can block effective enforcement of substantive law. See infra notes 147–50 and
accompanying text. The only aspect of the Rule 26 amendments that forecloses discovery that might otherwise
have been available is the elimination of Rule 26(b)(1)’s rarely used “second tier”; as explained infra Section
III.C, however, this is unlikely to make a significant difference in practice.
11 FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (discussed infra notes 199–203 and
accompanying text).
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This is not to defend the 2015 amendments. The best that can be said for
them is that they left the status quo largely in place, and that is hardly a
resounding endorsement. But for those who are justifiably concerned about the
potential for more restrictive pleading and discovery standards to obstruct access
and to weaken enforcement, this should be welcome news.
In doing so little, however, the 2015 amendments mark another kind of
transformation. They seem to confirm the view that the rules amendment process
is unlikely to yield significant changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(for better or for worse). The process leading toward the 2015 amendments was
teed up almost perfectly for the cost-and-delay narrative to change the rules of
civil procedure in detrimental ways. Yet those efforts failed. That failure, in fact,
parallels unsuccessful attempts in Congress to legislate more restrictive
approaches to important procedural issues.12
The current state of affairs—which stems from a combination of
developments in recent years13—might be called a post-legislative era in civil
procedure. While this situation has the potential upside that neither the rules
amendment process nor Congress is likely to make legislative changes that will
subvert the original vision of the Federal Rules, other institutions may pose more
serious threats. First and foremost, there is the Supreme Court, which
institutionally may be better positioned than either Congress or the rule
amendment process to take civil procedure down a more restrictive path.14 This
concern may seem self-evident given the controversy surrounding many of the
Court’s recent decisions on civil procedure.15
12 The last piece of congressional legislation to have a significant effect on the procedural rules that mediate
access and enforcement was the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. See generally Edward F. Sherman, Class
Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1593–94 (2006) (describing the effect
of the Class Action Fairness Act). In the decade since, proposed legislation on a range of procedural issues has
failed to become law. See infra notes 217–19 and accompanying text.
13 Burbank & Farhang, supra note 2, at 1562–82, discussed infra notes 217–20 and accompanying text.
14 See id. at 1580–82.
15 See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133
S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333 (2011); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,
564 U.S. 873 (2011); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). See generally Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme
Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1470–72 (2013); Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American
Civil Litigation, 65 EMORY L.J. 1491, 1514–17, 1525–29 (2016); Miller, supra note 2, at 310; Judith Resnik,
Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125
HARV. L. REV. 78, 81–84, 91–104, 161–68 (2011); Subrin & Main, supra note 2, at 1869; Noam Scheiber, As
Americans Take Up Populism, the Supreme Court Embraces Business, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/business/as-americans-take-up-populism-the-supreme-court-embraces-
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But for the key issues that were the focus of the 2015 amendments, it is less
clear than one might suspect that the Supreme Court will impose more restrictive
approaches by handing down precedent-setting decisions on discovery and
pleading standards. A district court’s ruling on whether a particular discovery
request comports with proportionality considerations, for example, is an
interlocutory ruling that is rarely subject to appellate review (much less Supreme
Court review).16 Pleading standards, of course, were the subject of the Supreme
Court’s controversial decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly17 and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal.18 But those decisions did not necessarily mandate a stricter approach to
pleading—indeed, more recent Supreme Court decisions suggest otherwise.19 So
although empirical studies indicate that federal courts have (at least for some
kinds of cases) applied pleading standards more restrictively after Twombly and
Iqbal,20 one explanation may be that lower courts have been misinterpreting
those decisions.21
There is a crucial lesson in this as courts and scholars try to make sense of
the 2015 amendments. The outputs of law-generating decisions—whether
binding precedents from the Supreme Court or amendments to positive-law rules
and statutes—are not self-defining. Federal judges, particularly lower court

business.html. Because the Supreme Court divided 5–4 in some of these controversial decisions, the passing of
Justice Scalia earlier this year may have a major impact on the Supreme Court’s approach to these issues going
forward. See Adam Liptak & Quoctrung Bui, Supreme Court Precedents That May Be at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/18/us/politics/19-precedents.html.
16 See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108 (2009) (“[W]e have generally denied
review of pretrial discovery orders.” (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377
(1981))).
17 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
18 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
19 See Adam N. Steinman, The Rise and Fall of Plausibility Pleading?, 69 VAND. L. REV. 333, 336 (2016)
(“[I]f one takes the reasoning of Twombly and Iqbal seriously, there was indeed a path forward that would retain
the notice-pleading approach set forth in the text of the Federal Rules and confirmed by pre-Twombly case law.
That path was always the best way to make sense of Twombly and Iqbal, and it appears to be the path the Court
itself has taken in more recent decisions.” (footnote omitted)).
20 See infra notes 70–71 and accompanying text (describing the empirical effects of Twombly and Iqbal).
21 See supra note 19. Some federal courts explicitly recognized that Twombly and Iqbal should not be read
to undermine the notice pleading standard that has long been a bedrock of federal civil procedure. See, e.g.,
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting the pre-Twombly understanding that “all
that is necessary is that the claim for relief be stated with brevity, conciseness, and clarity,” that “a basic objective
of the rules is to avoid civil cases turning on technicalities and to require that the pleading discharge the function
of giving the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the pleader’s claim and a general
indication of the type of litigation that is involved,” and that Twombly and Iqbal do not “undermine[ ] these
broad principles”). This is not to excuse the problematic aspects of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, but rather
to recognize that—as lawmaking events—those decisions should not be interpreted to require a more restrictive
approach to pleading. See Steinman, supra note 19, at 364–67.
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judges, have to interpret and apply those rules and precedents in particular cases.
That is where the rubber hits the road, and that is where battles about the 2015
amendments will be fought. Now that the amendments have been finalized, the
question is how they should be interpreted going forward.
Chief Justice Roberts’s behavior in the wake of the 2015 amendments
confirms this point. The Chief has a long history—dating back to his days as a
lawyer in the Reagan White House—that puts him squarely in the againstjudicial-access camp.22 It is not surprising, then, that he has taken a number of
steps to encourage lower courts to apply more restrictive approaches to pleading
and discovery following the 2015 amendments. He made the amendments the
centerpiece of his 2015 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary.23 In that
report, the Chief Justice portrayed the discovery amendments as a “significant
change” that demands “increased reliance” on the proportionality
considerations.24 With respect to the abrogation of Rule 84 and the various
pleading forms, he flatly contradicted the advisory committee note’s instruction
that removing the forms “d[id] not alter existing pleading standards”;25 instead,
Chief Justice Roberts asserted that the eliminated forms were “obsolete” and did
not “reflect current practice and procedure.”26 His Year-End Report then
directed readers to what he called “revised” pro se forms that were posted on the
U.S. Courts’ website—forms that could be read to impose higher burdens on
plaintiffs at the pleading stage.27
Neither the Chief Justice’s Year-End Report nor the new batch of pro se
forms is legally authoritative. They were not approved via the Rules Enabling
Act process, nor can they be said to create any sort of binding precedent for
lower courts via stare decisis. More importantly, they mischaracterize the
amendments themselves. Yet Chief Justice Roberts and his allies may ultimately
win the day if they are able to control the gestalt surrounding the 2015
amendments in a way that persuades lower court judges to take a more restrictive
approach to pleading standards and access to discovery.
The Chief Justice’s recent moves deserve criticism from those who are
legitimately concerned about weakening meaningful judicial enforcement. But
22

See infra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.
See JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2015) [hereinafter
2015 YEAR-END REPORT], http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf.
24 Id. at 5–7.
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
26 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 23, at 8–9.
27 See infra notes 239–46 and accompanying text.
23
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such critiques must target more than just the Chief’s apparent policy preferences
when it comes to civil procedure and access to justice. They should also
challenge his assumptions about what the 2015 amendments actually do.
Properly interpreted, the 2015 amendments do not mandate more restrictive
approaches to pleading standards or access to discovery. Maneuvers like the
Year-End Report and the new pro se forms do not change the law of civil
procedure. To the contrary, the need to resort to such tactics confirms that the
attempt to achieve more ambitious substantive changes to the rules themselves
was unsuccessful.
Part I of this Article describes the path that led to the 2015 amendments: the
simplified, merits-driven vision of the Federal Rules’ initial drafters, the
Supreme Court’s potentially disruptive decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, the
post-Iqbal activity of the relevant rulemaking committees, and the initial
proposal that was circulated for notice and comment in the summer of 2013.
Part II summarizes the comments that were submitted in response to that initial
proposal, and the revisions that the rulemaking committees made following the
public comment period. Part III closely examines the key aspects of the 2015
amendments as they pertain to access to discovery and pleading standards and
explains how they do not mandate more restrictive approaches for either issue.
Finally, Part IV argues that the real lesson of the 2015 amendments is that
they confirm, as a practical matter, that the rules amendment process is unlikely
to be an effective mechanism for subverting the original vision of the Federal
Rules. The key battleground, therefore, will be in the federal courts, as judges
are called upon to interpret and apply the rules in particular cases. This Part then
describes Chief Justice Roberts’s efforts to spin the 2015 amendments and
argues that federal courts should interpret and apply the rules as they are written,
not as the Chief Justice wishes they were written.
I. THE PATH TOWARD PROCEDURAL RECALIBRATION?
To set the stage for the 2015 amendments, this Part begins by laying out the
Federal Rules’ initial vision on pleading standards and access to discovery. It
then explains how the Supreme Court’s controversial decisions in Twombly and
Iqbal raised questions about both the proper approach to pleading and the
desirability of court-supervised discovery, prompting renewed activity by the
various rulemaking committees on those topics. Finally, it describes the initial
template for the 2015 amendments—the batch of proposals that was circulated
for public comment in August 2013.
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A. A Brief History of the Federal Rules
Two crucial features of the initial Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which
took effect in 1938) were the new rules’ approaches to pleading and discovery.
With respect to both issues, the goal was to enable the judicial enforcement of
substantive law by removing unnecessary obstacles to adjudicating cases on
their merits.28 The general pleading standard in the Federal Rules was—and
remains—Rule 8’s instruction that a complaint need only provide “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”29 This
pleading standard was meant to provide a simpler approach than had
traditionally been required under either common-law pleading or code pleading,
to facilitate determinations of cases on their merits.30
The Federal Rules illustrated this simpler approach with several hypothetical
complaints that were included in the rules’ appendix. One of them provided that
a negligence complaint would satisfy Rule 8 by alleging: “On date, at place, the
defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.”31 A
hypothetical patent infringement complaint, using the example of electric
motors, provided that it would be sufficient to allege: “The defendant has
infringed and is still infringing the Letters Patent by making, selling, and using

28 See WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE, MARCUS, SPENCER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, at § 1008; Miller, supra
note 2, at 288 (“[T]he distinguished proceduralists who drafted the Federal Rules believed in citizen access to
the courts and in the resolution of disputes on their merits, not by tricks or traps or obfuscation.”); Subrin &
Main, supra note 2, at 1843 (“The drafters of the Federal Rules wanted cases to be resolved on the merits.”)
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (2015). As described below, this language has remained unchanged since its
initial adoption in 1938. See infra note 46.
30 See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 2, at 1584 (“In rejecting common law pleading, . . . the drafters of
the 1938 Federal Rules embraced the insights of legal realism. Pleadings are an inferior method to find out what
actually happened . . . .”(footnote omitted)); Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297,
319 (1938) (“[I]n the case of a real dispute, there is no substitute anywhere for a trial. To attempt to make the
pleadings serve as such substitute is in very truth to make technical forms the mistress and not the handmaid of
justice.”); Miller, supra note 2, at 288–89 (“Because the rulemakers were deeply steeped in the history of the
debilitating technicalities and rigidity that characterized the prior English and American procedural systems—
that is, the common law forms of action and then the codes—the Rules established an easily satisfied pleading
regime for stating a grievance that abjured factual triviality, verbosity, and technicality.” (footnote omitted)).
31 FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11, ¶ 2 (2014) (abrogated 2015), reprinted in Steinman, supra note 19, at 395.
Until 2007, this form appeared as Form 9 and was drafted slightly differently. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 576 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting former Form 9: “On June 1, 1936, in a public highway
called Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff
who was then crossing said highway”); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 n.4 (2002). The 2007
change occurred as part of a general restyling of the Federal Rules, which was intended “to be stylistic only”
and “to make no changes in substantive meaning.” FED R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s notes to 2007
amendment.
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electric motors that embody the patented invention. . . .”32 Judge Charles Clark,
the chief drafter of the original Federal Rules, believed that these sample
complaints were “the most important part of the rules” as far as illustrating
Rule 8’s pleading standard.33
For the Federal Rules’ first seven decades, Supreme Court case law
expounded the simplified approach to pleading commanded by the text of Rule 8
and these illustrative forms. In 1957, Conley v. Gibson made clear that “the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the
facts upon which he bases his claim.”34 Rather, a complaint is sufficient as long
as it “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.”35 During the half-century that followed Conley,
the Court repeatedly quoted and applied the “fair notice” standard.36 As the
Court explained as recently as 2002, “[t]his simplified notice pleading standard
relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define
disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.”37
Indeed, the discovery process set forth in the initial rules was also integral to
the drafters’ procedural vision.38 It permitted depositions and other forms of
discovery “regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action . . . .”39 In Hickman v. Taylor,40 nine years
after the rules came into effect, the Court wrote that discovery under the Federal
Rules plays “a vital role in the preparation for trial” by “narrow[ing] and
32 See FED. R. CIV. P. Form 18, ¶ 3 (2014) (abrogated 2015), reprinted in Steinman, supra note 19, at 397.
This language derived from Form 16 of the original rules, but became Form 18 in 2007.
33 Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 181 (1958) (“What we require
[in Rule 8] is a general statement of the case . . . . We do not require detail. We require a general statement. How
much? Well, the answer is made in what I think is probably the most important part of the rules so far as this
particular topic is concerned, namely, the Forms.”).
34 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
37 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
38 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947) (“The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism
established by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most significant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”).
39 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1938), reprinted in 308 U.S. 663, 694 (1939); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 33 (1938),
reprinted in 308 U.S. at 707 (authorizing interrogatories); FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1938), reprinted in 308 U.S. at
707–08 (permitting upon motion and showing of good cause an order that a party produce documents and things);
FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a) (1938), reprinted in 308 U.S. at 709 (authorizing requests for admission); Burbank &
Farhang, supra note 2, at 1584 (“[T]he architects of the 1938 Federal Rules wrote rules that afforded much
broader discovery than had been available in equity or in any of the merged systems in the states.”).
40 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

STEINMAN GALLEYSPROOFS3

2016]

9/26/2016 8:24 AM

THE END OF AN ERA?

11

clarify[ing] the basic issues between the parties” and “ascertaining the facts, or
information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those
issues.”41 As one leading treatise puts it: “The basic philosophy underlying this
procedure was that prior to trial every party to a civil action is entitled to the
disclosure of all relevant information in the possession of any person, unless the
information is privileged.”42
As with the rules’ simplified pleading standard, the discovery process was
designed to allow disputes to be resolved on their merits by providing a
mechanism for the parties to uncover the relevant facts and evidence.43 There is,
of course, a crucial connection between pleading and discovery. The simplified
pleading standard was what enabled a case to proceed to the discovery process.44
Unless the myriad of obstacles that characterized code pleading and commonlaw pleading were eliminated, robust discovery would often be useless; the
information needed to satisfy the pleading standard could not be obtained unless
the plaintiff was able to get past the pleading phase so he or she could make use
of the discovery process.45
While the text of the federal pleading standard has remained the same since
1938,46 the discovery rules have undergone a number of changes.47 The original
language in Rule 26(b) allowed discovery:
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action, whether relating to the claim or
defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of any other
41

Id. at 501.
WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE, MARCUS, SPENCER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, at § 2001; see also Hickman,
329 U.S. at 501 (“The way is now clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.”).
43 See Miller, supra note 2, at 289 (noting that the rules “made available a wide-angle discovery into the
facts underlying the dispute’s merits, enabling the parties to secure any information relevant to the subject matter
of the action”); id. at 333 (“Philosophically, at least, the Federal Rules say: ‘Feel injured? Well, come on in, this
is a friendly, justice seeking litigation system, and we will sort the merits out after everyone has access to the
facts through discovery.’”).
44 See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 19, at 389 (“The initial pleading is the key to the courthouse door. A
claim that cannot survive the pleading phase is effectively no claim at all.”).
45 See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 2, at 1352 (noting that pleading standards can place plaintiffs “in the
Catch-22 of needing court-supervised discovery to uncover the factual and evidentiary details that would be
required to get past the pleadings phase to discovery”).
46 Then and now, Rule 8(a) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (1938), reprinted in 308 U.S. 663, 672 (1939), with FED. R.
CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (2015).
47 See generally WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE, MARCUS, SPENCER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, at §§ 2002–
2003.1 (discussing amendments to the federal discovery rules).
42
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party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition,
and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.48

In 1946, Rule 26(b) was revised to clarify that a responding party could not
object to discovery on the ground that the information sought “will be
inadmissible at the trial” as long as the information sought “appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”49
In 1983, Rule 26(b)(1) was amended to add the following provision:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in
subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is
obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had
ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information
sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive,
taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
limitations on the parties’ resources, and the importance of the issues
at stake in the litigation.50

According to the advisory committee note accompanying the amendment, this
change was designed “to guard against redundant or disproportionate discovery
by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be
directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry” and “to
encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging

48 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1938). This original language “spoke only to the scope of examination on a
deposition,” but “[m]ost courts [had] held that the broad scope defined in Rule 26(b) was controlling in
measuring the scope of discovery by devices other than depositions.” WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE, MARCUS,
SPENCER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, at § 2003. With the 1970 amendments, Rule 26(b) was “recast to cover the
scope of discovery generally,” and to “regulate[]the discovery obtainable through any of the discovery
devices . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment (Subdivision (b)—Scope of
Discovery).
49 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1946), reprinted in 329 U.S. 847, 854 (1946). As discussed supra note 48, the text
of the original discovery rules focused on obtaining testimony through depositions. Accordingly, the new 1946
sentence stated: “It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. In 1970—when
Rule 26(b) was revised to encompass the full range of discovery devices—this sentence was amended to read:
“It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)
(1970).
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1983).
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discovery overuse.”51 In 1993, Rule 26(b)(1) was “subdivided into two
paragraphs for ease of reference,” and these proportionality considerations were
placed in Rule 26(b)(2).52
The 1993 amendments also imposed presumptive numerical limits for
certain discovery devices: ten depositions per side,53 and twenty-five
interrogatories per party.54 In 2000, amendments took effect that created a
presumptive durational limit for each deposition: one day of seven hours.55
These limits were not inflexible, however; courts retained the authority to allow
discovery beyond the presumptive limits (as well as to restrict parties to less
discovery than allowed by the presumptive limits).56
The 2000 amendments made other changes as well. The language regarding
the relationship between discoverability and admissibility was clarified to
emphasize that the information must still be “relevant” in order to fall within the
scope of discovery.57 The 2000 amendment also modified the scope of discovery
51 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. See generally Miller, supra note 2, at
353–54 (describing the 1983 amendments). The 1983 amendment added similar language to Rule 26(g),
providing that the attorney’s signature on a discovery request:

constitutes a certification that [the signer] has read the request . . . and that to the best of [the
signer’s] knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent
with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not
unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery
already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (1983) (emphasis added).
52 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (subdivision (b)).
53 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (subdivision (a)).
54 See FED. R. CIV. P. 33 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (subdivision (a)).
55 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (subdivision (d)).
56 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (subdivision (a)) (“Leave to take
additional depositions should be granted when consistent with the principles of Rule 26(b)(2), and in some cases
the ten-per-side limit should be reduced in accordance with those same principles.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 33 advisory
committee’s note to 1993 amendment (subdivision (a)) (“As with the number of depositions authorized by
Rule 30, leave to serve additional interrogatories is to be allowed when consistent with Rule 26(b)(2). The aim
is not to prevent needed discovery, but to provide judicial scrutiny before parties make potentially excessive use
of this discovery device.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (subdivision (d))
(“The presumptive duration may be extended, or otherwise altered, by agreement. Absent agreement, a court
order is needed. The party seeking a court order to extend the examination, or otherwise alter the limitations, is
expected to show good cause to justify such an order.”).
57 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (subdivision (b)(1)). The 2000
language stated: “Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000).
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by creating a two-tiered structure. The first tier—which required no prior
authorization by the court—covered “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant
to any party’s claim or defense.”58 The second tier—which required a finding of
“good cause” by the court—permitted discovery of “any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action.”59 Thus, if good cause was shown, a court
had discretion to permit discovery into matters beyond what was relevant to the
claims or defenses but within what was relevant to the “subject matter
involved.”60
B. The Shot(s) Heard Round the World: Twombly, Iqbal, and Why They
Matter
There is nothing fundamentally new about arguments that procedural rules
should be recalibrated to make it harder for parties to access the federal courts.
After all, a procedural system that enables enforcement of substantive rights and
obligations means that those who violate the substantive law can be held
accountable in ways that might otherwise have been impossible.61 Not
58

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added). See generally In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1188 (10th Cir.
2009) (noting that the 2000 amendment “implemented a two-tiered discovery process; the first tier being
attorney-managed discovery of information relevant to any claim or defense of a party, and the second being
court-managed discovery that can include information relevant to the subject matter of the action”); Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69
TENN. L. REV. 13, 18 (2001) (“To put it in the terms colloquially used by litigators who seek more court
management of contentious discovery, the amended rule’s second tier aims to provide ‘adult supervision’ to
contain possible squabbles when any party seeks and may engage in broader subject-matter discovery.”).
60 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (subdivision (b)(1)) (“The rule
change signals to the court that it has the authority to confine discovery to the claims and defenses asserted in
the pleadings, and signals to the parties that they have no entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or
defenses that are not already identified in the pleadings . . . . The court may permit broader discovery in a
particular case depending on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the claims and defenses, and the scope
of the discovery requested.”).
61 See Miller, supra note 2, at 353 (noting defense interests’ objections to the federal discovery process
and observing that “unconstrained discovery allows plaintiffs to look behind their clients’ curtains—thereby
providing access to otherwise unobtainable information that possibly cuts too close to the substantive bone and
endangers the defense’s position on a dispute’s merits”). Of course, enforcement of substantive law through
private litigation is not the only available method. Public enforcement by government officers or agencies is an
option too. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 2, at 1549 (“The primary alternative is to empower and fund
administrative authorities to perform that enforcement function.”). In many areas of substantive law, however,
lawmaking bodies have opted for private rather than public enforcement. See id. at 1547 (“It is a legislative
choice to rely on private litigation in statutory implementation.”); id. at 1549 (“This reason to choose private
enforcement has become much more significant to American public policy since the late 1960s, when divided
party control of the legislative and executive branches became the norm and relations between Congress and the
President became more antagonistic.”); Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private
Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 648 (2013) (“A society’s general legal landscape is relevant to
59
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surprisingly, business groups and other powerful interests who tend to be
defendants in litigation have frequently pushed for procedural changes such as
heightened pleading standards and reduced access to discovery—both of which
create practical obstacles for parties seeking judicial remedies for violations of
substantive law.62
While these arguments have a long tradition, they were significantly
reinvigorated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly63 and Iqbal.64
Twombly was an antitrust class action alleging that America’s largest
telecommunications firms had engaged in an anti-competitive “contract,
combination . . . , or conspiracy” in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.65 Iqbal involved constitutional claims against Attorney General John
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller, brought by a Pakistani man who had
been detained by federal officials following the September 11th attacks.66 In
both cases the issue before the Court was whether the plaintiffs’ allegations
satisfied the federal pleading standard, and in both cases a divided Court found
that the complaints were insufficient and should be dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to satisfy the general pleading standard set forth in
Rule 8(a)(2).67
It remains unclear whether Twombly and Iqbal mandate a more restrictive
approach to pleading.68 There are certainly parts of those opinions that—when
read in isolation—indicate a new rigorous standard by which a plaintiff must
identify the evidence she will use to support her claims or include extensive
the choice of an enforcement strategy and may be critical to the efficacy of a private enforcement regime.”);
Freer, supra note 15, at 1522 (“There was a conscious political decision in the 1960s to expand rights and provide
for enforcement through litigation, rather than enforcement through the administrative state.”); id. at 1497 n.24
(“This was a recognition that the administrative state was not able to enforce the laws fully, and therefore it
enlisted private enforcement.”).
62 See, e.g., Burbank & Farhang, supra note 2, at 1588–89 (describing activities of the Chamber of
Commerce in the early 1970s and the Pound Conference organized by Chief Justice Burger in 1976, which
“[s]cholars have characterized . . . as the most important event in the counteroffensive against notice pleading
and broad discovery”); Miller, supra note 2, at 353 (“Vulnerability to discovery, after all, always has been a bête
noire of both business and government defendants.”).
63 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
64 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009).
65 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548.
66 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 667–69.
67 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-56; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–80, 683–84.
68 Compare, e.g., Subrin & Main, supra note 2, at 1848 (“Plausibility pleading . . . is nothing less than a
‘revolutionary’ departure from notice pleading and from the original vision of the Federal Rules.”), with
Steinman, supra note 19, at 351 (“Although the decisions are problematic in many respects, their approach to
pleading can and should be reconciled with the notice-pleading approach that characterized federal practice for
nearly seven decades.”).
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factual details, neither of which might be available to a plaintiff without access
to court-supervised discovery. The Court left considerable uncertainty regarding
the “plausibility” inquiry employed in those cases,69 and empirical studies have
found that Twombly and Iqbal have increased the likelihood that motions to
dismiss would be granted (at least for particular kinds of cases).70 Studies also
indicate that the decisions had significant selection effects—that is, parties were
opting not to pursue certain claims out of concern that they would founder on
the rocks of Twombly and Iqbal.71
There are other aspects of the Twombly and Iqbal opinions, however,
suggesting that the more lenient pleading approach envisioned by the original
rules’ drafters remains in place.72 This view finds further support in post-Iqbal
Supreme Court decisions on pleading standards.73 In other words, while
Twombly and Iqbal have had important empirical effects, the real cause may be
that lower courts and litigants are misinterpreting those cases. Read properly,
Twombly and Iqbal do not impose a stricter pleading standard.74
69

See Steinman, supra note 19, at 363 (noting that the Court “gave little meaningful guidance as to crucial
aspects of pleading doctrine and how that doctrine commanded the results in Twombly and Iqbal” and that its
creation of a “newly-constituted ‘plausibility’ inquiry . . . from thin air . . . [generated] confusion and
consternation”); see also Adam N. Steinman, To Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers of
Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L. REV. 1737, 1760–66 (2013) [hereinafter Steinman, To Say What the Law Is]
(noting the uncertainty surrounding what Iqbal means as a matter of stare decisis).
70 See, e.g., Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial
Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 12 (2012); Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated
Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 603 (2012); Alexander A.
Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117, 2143–44 (2015).
71 See Christina L. Boyd et al., Building a Taxonomy of Litigation: Clusters of Causes of Action in Federal
Complaints, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 253, 254 (2013); Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery?
Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2306–07 (2012).
72 See Steinman, supra note 19, at 366 (arguing that to read Twombly and Iqbal as imposing a more
restrictive pleading standard would ignore aspects of those decisions that explicitly embrace notice pleading and
pre-Twombly Supreme Court precedent); see also Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817 (8th Cir. 2010)
(“Twombly and Iqbal did not abrogate the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2).”); Swanson v. Citibank,
N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting “[t]he Supreme Court’s explicit decision to reaffirm the validity
of Swierkiewicz, which was cited with approval in Twombly” (citations omitted)); Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574,
581 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that Twombly had not “repudiated the general notice-pleading regime of Rule 8” and
that “[t]his continues to be the case after Iqbal.”).
73 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (stating that a complaint passed muster
under Twombly and Iqbal as long as it “stated simply, concisely, and directly events that, they alleged, entitled
them to damages”); see also Steinman, supra note 19, at 367–80 (discussing the Supreme Court’s post-Iqbal
decisions in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015), Fifth
Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014), Johnson, supra, Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056 (2014),
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011), and Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011)).
74 See Steinman, supra note 19, at 364–65 (recognizing the empirical consequences of Twombly and Iqbal
but arguing that “lower federal courts are wrong to take a more restrictive approach to pleading” (emphasis
omitted)).
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Whatever the correct reading of Twombly and Iqbal, those decisions gave
pleading standards a prominent place on the advisory committee’s agenda.75
They also prompted interest in the discovery process itself. In both Twombly and
Iqbal, the majority expressed concern about the burdens of discovery on
defendants in civil cases as well as skepticism about whether judicial
management of the discovery process after the pleading phase could adequately
alleviate those burdens.76
Twombly, for example, worried that “a plaintiff with a largely groundless
claim” might “be allowed to take up the time of a number of other people, with
the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement
value.”77 It also noted “the common lament that the success of judicial
supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.”78 Iqbal
invoked Twombly’s “rejection of the careful-case-management approach.”79 In
particular, it stated that, for governmental defendants like Ashcroft and Mueller,
the discovery process can “exact[] heavy costs in terms of efficiency and
expenditure of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to
the proper execution of the work of the Government.”80 There are serious
questions about the empirical validity of these assertions,81 but they certainly
provided added ammunition for those who favored more restrictive standards
for pleading and discovery.
C. Initial Steps in the Rulemaking Process
This section summarizes two crucial early steps in the process that
culminated in the 2015 amendments. The first was the 2010 “Duke Conference,”
which laid much of the groundwork for the current amendments. The second

75

See infra Section I.C.
See infra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
77 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (citation omitted).
78 Id. at 559 (citation omitted).
79 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685; see also id. at 686 (“We decline respondent’s invitation to relax the pleading
requirements on the ground that the Court of Appeals promises petitioners minimally intrusive discovery.”).
80 Id. at 685 (citation omitted).
81 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 3, at 58–59 & nn.226–30 (challenging Twombly’s reliance on “a somewhat
dated and highly theoretical 1989 journal article by Judge (then Professor) Frank H. Easterbrook” and data cited
in a 1999 memorandum by Judge Paul Niemeyer that was “questionable as to its coverage” and “not borne out
by more contemporary surveys”); see also id. at 79–82 (“Although some contemporary critics of case
management continue to cite Judge Easterbrook’s theoretical assumptions, there has been little research
conducted that confirms his conclusions, let alone research that systematically measures the amount or
consequences of any management shortfall.” (footnote omitted)).
76
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was the preliminary draft of the amendments that was circulated for public
comment in August 2013.
1. The 2010 Duke Conference
In the wake of Twombly and Iqbal, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee
organized the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation, which was held at Duke
University in May 2010. The conference was “designed as a disciplined
identification of litigation problems and exploration of the most promising
opportunities to improve federal civil litigation,”82 spurred on by “complaints
about the costs, delays, and burdens” of civil litigation in the federal courts.83
The Duke Conference would prove quite influential in the rulemaking
process that followed. The advisory committee created a Duke Conference
Subcommittee to evaluate and propose potential amendments, and the batch of
amendments that ultimately went into effect in December 2015 became known
as the “Duke Rules Package.”84 As justifications for its proposals, the various
committees and subcommittees emphasized several studies presented at the
Duke Conference.85 Many of these empirical studies have been challenged, with
critics questioning both their methodological validity and whether they
supported the particular rule changes that were ultimately proposed.86 These
critiques will be discussed in more detail below. But the important point here is
that such studies were tailor-made to bolster the sort of anti-access amendments
that those who oppose private enforcement through litigation have long desired.

82 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 1 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 DUKE CONFERENCE
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE].
83 Id.; see also Memorandum from Honorable David G. Campbell to Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton 260 (May
8, 2013, as supplemented June 2013) [hereinafter Civil Rules Advisory Committee Spring 2013 Report] (“The
2010 Duke Conference bristled with ideas for reducing cost and delay in civil litigation.”); Memorandum from
Honorable Mark R. Kravitz to Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal 7 (May 17, 2010) [hereinafter May 2010 Report of
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee] (“Had there been any doubt about perceptions of cost and delay, the 2010
Conference participants and papers dispelled it.”).
84 Civil Rules Advisory Committee Spring 2013 Report, supra note 83, at 260 (referring to the “‘Duke
Rules’ Package”); WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE, MARCUS, SPENCER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, at § 1007.
85 See 2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 82, at 2–4; see also Civil Rules
Advisory Committee Spring 2013 Report, supra note 83, at 265. (“Surveys produced in connection with the
Duke Conference by various groups . . . indicate that excessive discovery occurs in a worrisome number of cases,
particularly those that are complex, involve high stakes, and generate contentious adversary behavior.”).
86 See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, the Conference put pleading standards and access to discovery squarely
in the cross-hairs of the rulemaking activity that would follow.87
2. The 2013 Proposal
The process that began with the Duke Conference took a major step forward
in 2013, when the advisory committee completed a preliminary draft of proposed
amendments.88 The most controversial aspects of the proposal concerned
discovery and pleading standards, both of which—as discussed above—can be
crucial to whether meaningful judicial enforcement of substantive law is
available.89
With respect to discovery, the advisory committee first proposed reducing
the presumptive numerical limits for certain discovery devices. For depositions,
the presumptive number would be reduced from ten per side to five per side.90
In addition, the presumptive time limit for depositions would be reduced from
one day of seven hours to one day of six hours.91 The presumptive number of
interrogatories would be reduced from twenty-five per party to fifteen per

87 See 2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 82, at 5; May 2010 Report of
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 83, at 4 (noting that “[p]leading was addressed by many of the
participants at the 2010 Conference” and that “[t]he conference discussion of pleading inevitably tied to
discussion of discovery”).
88 PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL
PROCEDURE (August 2013) [hereinafter 2013 PRELIMINARY DRAFT], http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0001.
89 The August 2013 proposal contained amendments on a number of other issues as well: Rule 4(m)’s time
period for serving process after filing the complaint, the timing and contents of scheduling orders under
Rule 16(b), early requests for production of documents under Rule 34, objections and responses to Rule 34
requests, and sanctions for failing to take reasonable steps to preserve electronically stored information. See id.
at 282, 284–86, 294, 306–08, 314–17. These proposals remained in the final version and also became effective
on December 1, 2015. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m), 16(b), 26(d)(2), 34(b)(2), 37(e) (2015) (adopting the proposed
amendments). While these changes will merit attention going forward, they are beyond the scope of this Article.
90 2013 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 88, at 300 (proposed Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(i)) (requiring leave of
court “if the parties have not stipulated to the deposition and . . . the deposition would result in more than 5
depositions”); id. at 267 (“The proposals would reduce the presumptive limit on the number of depositions from
10 to 5.”).
91 Id. at 301 (proposed Rule 30(d)(1)) (“Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a deposition
is limited to one day of 6 hours.”); id. at 267 (“The proposals . . . would reduce the presumptive duration to 1
day of 6 hours.”).
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party.92 Requests for admission—which had not been subject to any presumptive
numerical limits—would be limited to twenty-five per party.93
More generally, the advisory committee proposed revising Rule 26(b) in
several ways. First, it proposed slightly revising the proportionality factors that
already existed as mandatory “limitations” on discovery in Rule 26(b)(2),94 and
transplanting them to Rule 26(b)(1), which defines the “scope of discovery.”95
As described above, those factors had initially been added into Rule 26 in
1983.96 Since 2000, the relevant language appeared in Rule 26(b)(2)(C), which
stated:
[T]he court must limit the frequency and extent of discovery otherwise
allowed . . . if it determines that: . . . the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs
of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of
the discovery in resolving the issues.97

Rule 26(b)(1) also made clear that “[a]ll discovery is subject to the limitations
imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”98
The 2013 proposal deleted the reference to these factors in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)
and added instead a requirement in Rule 26(b)(1) that discovery must be
“proportional to the needs of the case, considering the amount in controversy,
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the parties’ resources, the

92 Id. at 305 (proposed Rule 33(a)(1)) (“Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party may
serve on another party no more than 15 interrogatories, including all discrete subparts.”).
93 Id. at 310 (proposed Rule 36(a)(2)) (“Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party may
serve no more than 25 requests to admit under Rule 36(a)(1)(A) on any other party, including all discrete
subparts.”); see also id. at 268–69 (describing this proposal).
94 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (2014). The Rule states that:

[T]he court must limit the frequency and extent of discovery otherwise allowed . . . if it determines
that: . . . the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues
at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.
Id. (emphasis added).
95 See 2013 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 88, at 289–92 (proposed Rule 26(b)). Even under the rules
as they then existed, Rule 26(b)(1) made an explicit reference to the proportionality factors articulated in
Rule 26(b)(2)(C); Rule 26(b)(1) stated: “All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by
Rule 26(b)(2)(C).” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014).
96 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
97 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (2014).
98 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014).
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importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”99
Second, the advisory committee proposed revising the sentence in
Rule 26(b)(1) on the relationship between discoverability and admissibility.100
It replaced the sentence, “[r]elevant information need not be admissible at the
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence,”101 with the sentence, “[i]nformation within this scope of
discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.”102
Third, the advisory committee proposed eliminating what had come to be
known as the “second tier” of discovery in Rule 26(b)(1). Since 2000,
Rule 26(b)(1) permitted discovery without prior court authorization into matters
relevant to any party’s claim or defense (the so-called “first tier”).103 Parties
could also obtain discovery into matters relevant to the subject matter involved
in the action (the so-called “second tier”), but this required the court to find
“good cause” for such discovery.104 The 2013 proposal eliminated this secondtier authority to permit, upon a showing of good cause, discovery beyond what
was relevant to the parties’ claims or defenses.105
The advisory committee’s final proposal regarding Rule 26(b)(1) was to
remove a list of examples of matter that qualify as “relevant to any party’s claim
or defense.” The 2013 proposal deleted language stating that such “relevant”
matter “includ[es] the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and

99 2013 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 88, at 289–92 (proposed Rule 26(b)). The advisory committee
also proposed a minor amendment to Rule 1. Rule 1 had provided that the Federal Rules “should be construed
and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (2014). Under the advisory committee’s proposal, Rule 1 would also instruct that the rules
“should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” 2013 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 88, at 281
(proposed Rule 1) (emphasis added). Although the potential trade-offs between “just, speedy, and inexpensive”
determinations may in some sense parallel the proportionality considerations in Rule 26(b), Rule 1 does not
impose any independent restriction on access to discovery beyond what is already provided in Rule 26. See infra
note 151.
100 As described supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text, such language was initially added to Rule 26
in 1946 and was then revised in 2000.
101 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014).
102 2013 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 88, at 289–90 (proposed Rule 26(b)(1)).
103 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
104 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
105 See 2013 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 88, at 289–90 (proposed Rule 26(b)(1)).
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location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location
of persons who know of any discoverable matter.”106
The advisory committee also proposed revising the protective order
provision in Rule 26(c). Rule 26(c)(1) stated that courts—upon a showing of
“good cause”—may issue orders to “protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” by “issu[ing] an
order . . . specifying terms, including time and place, for the disclosure or
discovery.”107 The committee proposed adding “the allocation of expenses” as
another example of protective “terms” that a court might “specify[].”108
With respect to pleading standards, the 2013 proposal did not include any
change to the rules governing pleading standards, such as Rule 8 or
Rule 12(b)(6). The advisory committee did, however, recommend deleting all of
the pleading forms that appeared in the rules’ appendix; it would also delete
Rule 84, which instructed that those forms “suffice under these rules and
illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”109 This raised
concern about pleading standards because, as discussed above, the exemplar
complaints in the appendix illustrated the sort of lenient approach to pleading
contemplated by the original rules’ drafters.110
II. REACTION TO THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
This Part recounts the aftermath of the advisory committee’s initial proposal.
First, it summarizes the comments and critiques that came in response to the
proposal after the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (often referred to as the Standing Committee) approved it for
publication in August 2013, which began a six-month notice-and-comment
period. Second, this Part describes the changes that were made to the proposed
amendments following the official public comment period.

106

Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (2014).
108 See 2013 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 88, at 292–93 (proposed Rule 26(c)(1)) (“The court may, for
good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense, including one or more of the following: . . . (B) specifying terms, including time and place
or the allocation of expenses, for the disclosure or discovery.”).
109 See id. at 329–30 (proposing striking all of Rule 84 and all of the Appendix of Forms). The only two
forms the advisory committee proposed preserving had nothing to do with pleading standards. These forms
related to requesting a waiver of service of process under Rule 4(d), and the committee proposed placing them
following the text of Rule 4. See id. at 331–36 (proposed amendments to Rule 4).
110 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
107
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A. Responses from Attorneys, Judges, and Academics
During the six months following the release of its initial proposal, the
advisory committee held three public hearings and invited public comments.111
More than 2300 comments were submitted from attorneys, judges, and law
professors.112
Many of the comments criticized the amendments’ proposals on discovery
as well as the potential effect of the elimination of the forms on pleading
standards.113 Commenters repeatedly emphasized that more restrictive
111

See Adam Steinman, Proposed Amendments to the FRCPs: Now Published and Available for Comment,
CIVIL PROCEDURE & FEDERAL COURTS BLOG (Aug. 16, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2013/
08/proposed-amendments-to-the-frcps-now-published-and-available-for-comment.html.
112 See Adam Steinman, Next Steps in the FRCP Amendment Process, CIVIL PROCEDURE & FEDERAL
COURTS BLOG (Apr. 3, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2014/04/next-steps-in-the-frcpamendment-process.html.
113 See, e.g., Lois Bloom, U.S. Magistrate Judge, Comment on Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USCRULES-CV-2013-0002-0632; Stephen B. Burbank, Comment on Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=
USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0729; Brooke D. Coleman, Comment on Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0654; Ingrid Evans, Comment on Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0930; William Royal Ferguson, Comment on Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Feb. 14, 2014),
https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-1199; Elaine Gray, Comment
on Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Feb. 18, 2014),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-1797; Helen Hershkoff, Lonny
Hoffman, Alexander A. Reinert, Elizabeth M. Schneider, David L. Shapiro & Adam N. Steinman, Comment on
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Feb. 5, 2014) [hereinafter
Hershkoff, Hoffman, Reinert, Schneider, Shapiro & Steinman Comment], https:/www.regulations.gov/
#documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0622; Suzette M. Malveaux, Comment on Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-1650; Arthur R. Miller, Comment on Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0386; Patricia W. Moore, Comment on Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0491; Alan B. Morrison, Comment on Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dec. 31, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0383; Judith Resnik et al., Comment on Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-2078 (“We support the ‘Joint Comments by Professors
Helen Hershkoff, Lonny Hoffman, Alexander A. Reinert, Elizabeth M. Schneider, David L. Shapiro, and Adam
N. Steinman on Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.’”); Shira A. Scheindlin, U.S.
District Judge, Comment on Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0398;
Joseph M. Sellers, Comment on Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
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approaches to pleading and discovery would undermine access to the federal
courts and the judicial enforcement of substantive law.114 In addition, many
questioned the empirical basis for the proposed amendments, particularly the
studies on which the advisory committee relied to support its concerns about
“cost and delay.”115 Critics marshaled evidence undermining the view that
discovery or other aspects of federal pretrial procedure imposed unjustifiable
costs116 and detailed how existing provisions in the Federal Rules were more
than adequate to handle concerns that might arise in particular cases.117 They
also observed that the proposed amendments could encourage more discovery
disputes, which would itself increase cost and delay.118 With respect to the
elimination of Rule 84 and the pleading forms, commenters expressed concern

Procedure (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-00020325; Jonathan R. Siegel et al., Comment on Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-20130002-0493; Beth Thornburg, Comment on Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-20130002-0499; Stephen C. Yeazell, Comment on Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (Nov. 26, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-20130002-0342; Jay Zainey, U.S. District Judge, Comment on Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USCRULES-CV-2013-0002-0657.
114 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 113, at 12–13 (“[T]he proposed amendments do not reflect serious or
sustained consideration of the fact that limiting discovery may entail substantial costs for the enforcement of the
substantive law, including law that Congress, legislating against the background of the Federal Rules, intended
to be enforced through private litigation.”); id. at 18 (arguing that the proposed amendments would be “another
means of pricing the poor and middle class out of court”); Hershkoff, Hoffman, Reinert, Schneider, Shapiro &
Steinman Comment, supra note 113, at 1–2 (“[T]hey will create unnecessary barriers to relief in meritorious
cases, waste judicial resources, and drive up the cost of civil justice.”); Miller, supra note 113, at 4 (“Several of
the current proposals to amend the discovery rules . . . . reflect the significant turning away from the vision of
the original Federal Rules of a relatively unfettered and self-executing discovery regime—a true commitment to
‘equal access to all relevant data’ so critical to the effective resolution of disputes.”).
115 See, e.g., Hershkoff, Hoffman, Reinert, Schneider, Shapiro & Steinman Comment, supra note 113, at 1–
4; Moore, supra note 113, at 2; see also Burbank, supra note 113, at 9 (“Methodologically sound empirical data
concerning discovery have been remarkably consistent in debunking claims of ubiquitous abuse or excess made
by bar organizations and the business community over the last forty years.”).
116 See, e.g., Hershkoff, Hoffman, Reinert, Schneider, Shapiro & Steinman Comment, supra note 113, at 2–
3; Moore, supra note 113, at 2–6; Thornburg, supra note 113, at 1–2.
117 See, e.g., Hershkoff, Hoffman, Reinert, Schneider, Shapiro & Steinman Comment, supra note 113, at 17
(noting that the “best current empirical evidence suggest[s] that trial judges are managing the vast majority of
their dockets well”).
118 See, e.g., id. at 11 (arguing that the proposal to lower presumptive limits for certain discovery devices
“will likely spawn more discovery disputes”); Miller, supra note 113, at 9 (“[T]he proposed amendment is fertile
ground for increased costs and delays.”); id. at 11 (“I fear that the proposed amendments could produce increased
motion practice costs, delays, consumption of judicial time better spent in other ways, [and] fact-dependent
hearings . . . .”).
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that it would effectively—and unjustifiably—resolve debates over post-Iqbal
pleading standards in favor of a more restrictive approach.119
The proposed amendments also reinvigorated critiques of the composition of
the rulemaking committees themselves. With respect to both the Standing
Committee and the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, both chairpersons were
federal judges who had been appointed to the federal bench by a Republican
President—George W. Bush.120 Membership on the two committees was also
tilted in favor of judges appointed by Republican Presidents and practitioners
whose practice emphasized civil defense and business interests.121
The makeup of these committees is not surprising given that the chairs and
members of each rulemaking committee are determined entirely by the Chief
Justice.122 Chief Justice Roberts, like the committee chairs and most of the
judges he placed on the standing and civil rules committees, was also appointed
by a Republican President.123 Moreover, empirical studies of the Chief’s votes
119

See, e.g., Hershkoff, Hoffman, Reinert, Schneider, Shapiro & Steinman Comment, supra note 113, at 16
(“The Committee’s second explanation, that the Forms cannot be squared with the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Twombly and Iqbal, prematurely resolves a question that the Committee has yet to fully consider. . . . It is
premature to call an end to the debate . . . .”); Miller, supra note 113, at 12 (“[E]liminating the forms, including
those showing the intended simplicity of pleading under the Federal Rules, will be construed as the rulemakers’
acceptance—or implicit codification—of plausibility pleading under Twombly and Iqbal when in reality there
has not been any fundamental re-examination of the possible deleterious effects of those cases’ return to fact
pleading, or any comprehensive or penetrating empiric research on the subject . . . .”); see also Siegel et al.,
supra note 113, at 2–3 (arguing against abrogating the forms because the forms, not Twombly and Iqbal, reflect
the correct interpretation of Rule 8’s pleading standard). One scholar argued that eliminating the Forms without
addressing the text of Rule 8 would violate the Rules Enabling Act process. See Coleman, supra note 113, at 2;
see also Brooke D. Coleman, Abrogation Magic: The Rules Enabling Act Process, Civil Rule 84, and the Forms,
15 NEV. L.J. 1093, 1106 (2015).
120 See Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083,
1145–46 (2015).
121 See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An
Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1567–76 (2015); Moore, supra note 120, at 1146–52; see also Miller,
supra note 113, at 5 (“[The proposed amendments] appear to have been motivated, at least in part, by the ongoing
concern of defense interests that broad discovery allows plaintiffs to look behind their clients’ curtains, thereby
providing access to otherwise unobtainable oral and documentary information that may well cut too close to the
substantive bone and endanger the defense because it may well reveal a claim’s merits, thereby increasing the
risk of liability and enhancing the case’s settlement value.”).
122 Burbank & Farhang, supra note 2, at 1605 (“The Chief Justice not only appoints all members of the
rulemaking committees; he meets regularly with the chairs of the key rulemaking committees.”).
123 See supra note 120. This was also the case under Chief Justice Rehnquist. See Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery “Reform”, 64 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 197, 250–51 (2001). Indeed, critiques of the committee’s composition and the role of the Chief Justice
in the rulemaking process have a long history. See, e.g., Howard Lesnik, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A
Time for Re-examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579, 581 (1975) (“The composition of the advisory committees should
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on the Supreme Court place him as one of the two most pro-business Justices in
the Court’s history (second only to his current colleague Justice Alito),124 and
one of “the most anti-private enforcement Justices on the modern Supreme
Court.”125 Indeed, as a young lawyer in the Justice Department, Roberts was
ensconced in one of the Reagan Administration’s early legislative battles to
reduce judicial access and enforcement by capping fee awards in cases where
private litigants sue to enforce federal law.126
B. Post-Comment Revisions to the Proposed Amendments
Despite the strong criticism the 2013 proposal received during the comment
period, most of the proposed amendments remained in the set that was ultimately
adopted by the Supreme Court.127 One important change, however, was to
withdraw the proposals that would have (1) lowered the presumptive numbers
of depositions and interrogatories, (2) imposed a presumptive limit on the
number of requests to admit, and (3) reduced the presumptive length of
depositions.128

be more representative, and the appropriateness of the extreme centralization of authority in the Chief Justice
should be examined.”).
124 See Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 1449–50 (2013) (ranking Justice Alito and Chief Justice
Roberts first and second based on Supreme Court decisions since 1946).
125 Burbank & Farhang, supra note 2, at 1554; see also id. at 1572–73 (finding that during the period from
1970 until 2013, “[t]he four most anti-private enforcement scores are those of Thomas, Alito, Roberts, and
Scalia”).
126 See id. at 1553–54:
Advocates of retrenching private enforcement recognized that the proliferation of fee-shifting
provisions in the 1970s had produced a private enforcement infrastructure not just among liberal
public interest groups, but also, more significantly, among the for-profit American bar.
....
John Roberts, then working for the Reagan Justice Department, was another active participant in
deliberations over the fee-cap bill.
127 See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, APRIL 2014 CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE AGENDA
BOOK 5 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rules-civilprocedure-april-2014.
128 The Duke Conference Subcommittee recommended withdrawal of these proposals following the
comment period. See id. at 79. The Civil Rules Advisory Committee agreed and modified the amendments
accordingly. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, OCTOBER 2014 CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE
AGENDA BOOK 20 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committeerules-civil-procedure-october-2014.
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In addition, several revisions were made to the proposed committee notes
that had accompanied the advisory committee’s 2013 proposals.129 An
especially significant change occurred in the spring of 2015, shortly before the
Supreme Court adopted the amendments. In response to a request from the
Supreme Court itself, the advisory committee note that would accompany the
abrogation of Rule 84 was revised to state: “The abrogation of Rule 84 does not
alter existing pleading standards or otherwise change the requirements of Civil
Rule 8.”130
On April 29, 2015, the Supreme Court adopted the final version of the
amendments, ordering that the rules be amended and providing that those
amendments would take effect on December 1, 2015.131 These dates conformed
to the window set forth in the Rules Enabling Act during which Congress may
reject or modify any amendments to the Federal Rules via legislation.132 The Act
provides that any amendments adopted by the Court prior to May 1 of a given
year will become effective on December 1 of that year absent congressional
action.133
Given contemporary gridlock in Congress,134 no one expected a legislative
response to the 2015 amendments. Indeed, Congress remained on the sidelines
and the rules officially went into effect on December 1, 2015.

129 The committee note for the Rule 26 amendment, for example, was almost completely overhauled.
Compare 2013 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 88, at 296–99 (proposed advisory committee note to Rule 26),
with FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
130 FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 23 (Mar. 2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/reports-proceedings-judicial-conference-us (“[I]n response to a
request from the Supreme Court, the [Standing Committee] recommended modest modifications to the
committee notes accompanying the proposed amendments to Rules 4(m) and 84, noting that such modifications
reflected the Committee’s intent.”).
131 See Supreme Court Order Adopting the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Apr. 29,
2015).
132 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74 (2012) (describing the process and timing for prescribing rules of procedure
under the Rules Enabling Act).
133 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (“The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year
in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule shall
take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise provided
by law.”).
134 See generally Symposium, The American Congress: Legal Implications of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2065 (2013) (symposium issue containing twelve articles on congressional gridlock).
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III. THE 2015 AMENDMENTS: A CLOSE READING
Now that the ink has dried on the 2015 amendments, the question shifts to
how they have changed the pleading and discovery standards that are so crucial
to meaningful access and enforcement. This Part closely analyzes the final
version of the 2015 amendments, and explains why they do not compel more
restrictive approaches to pleading or discovery.135 Part IV will address some of
the larger lessons that can be learned from the fact that the process that
culminated in these amendments failed to impose a more restrictive approach,
even though many involved in the process seemed to favor heightened pleading
standards and reduced access to discovery.
A. Scope and Proportionality
One of the most controversial aspects of the recent amendments was that
they moved what had come to be known as the “proportionality” factors from
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to Rule 26(b)(1). Prior to the 2015 amendments,
Rule 26(b)(1) defined the “scope of discovery” as “any nonprivileged matter that
is relevant to any party’s claim or defense” and commanded that “[a]ll discovery
is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”136 Rule 26(b)(2)(C),
in turn, mandated that:
[T]he court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise
allowed . . . if it determines that . . . the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs
of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of
the discovery in resolving the issues.”137

These so-called “proportionality factors” had been part of the discovery rules
since 1983, when they also appeared in Rule 26(b)(1).138 In 1993, those factors
135 As described supra note 89, the final version also included amendments affecting several other issues,
including Rule 4(m)’s time period for serving process after filing the complaint, the timing and contents of
scheduling orders under Rule 16(b), early requests for production of documents under Rule 34, objections and
responses to Rule 34 requests, and sanctions for failing to take reasonable steps to preserve electronically stored
information.
136 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014).
137 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (2014).
138 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. Indeed, the advisory committee note explicitly referred
to proportionality in explaining the objective of the 1983 amendment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory
committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“The objective is to guard against redundant or disproportionate
discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be directed to matters that
are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry.”). Courts often did so as well. See, e.g., Sacramona v.
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were moved to Rule 26(b)(2)(C), simply “for ease of reference.”139 The 2000
amendments added a sentence to Rule 26(b)(1) instructing that “[a]ll discovery
is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2),”140 but the advisory
committee note recognized that this was a “redundant cross-reference.”141
For more than thirty years, therefore, it was clear that parties could invoke
these proportionality considerations when opposing discovery requests, and that
courts were required to enforce these considerations when managing the
discovery process. Former Rule 26(b)(1) stated that “[a]ll discovery” was
subject to Rule 26(b)(2)(C)’s limitations,142 and Rule 26(b)(2)(C) stated that “the
court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery” according to the
proportionality factors.143
The 2015 amendments moved these proportionality factors from
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) to Rule 26(b)(1). Thus, the scope of discovery is now defined
as:
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit.144

Given the decades-long presence of these proportionality considerations in
Rule 26(b), it is hard to understand why there was any need to move them from
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 428, 431 (D. Mass. 1993); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem.
Co., Civ. A. No. 88-9752, 1991 WL 183842, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1991); Leksi, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 129
F.R.D. 99, 105 (D.N.J. 1989); Advanced Semiconductor Prods., Inc. v. Tau Labs., Inc., No. 83-20412 RPA,
1986 WL 215149, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1986); In re Convergent Techs. Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 330–31
(N.D. Cal. 1985); Wigler v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 108 F.R.D. 204, 205–06 (D. Md. 1985).
139 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
140 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (2000).
141 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
[A] sentence has been added calling attention to the limitations of subdivision (b)(2)(i), (ii), and
(iii). These limitations apply to discovery that is otherwise within the scope of subdivision (b)(1).
The Committee has been told repeatedly that courts have not implemented these limitations with
the vigor that was contemplated. This otherwise redundant cross-reference has been added to
emphasize the need for active judicial use of subdivision (b)(2) . . . .
Id. (citations omitted).
142 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014) (emphasis added).
143 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (2014) (emphasis added).
144 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2015).
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26(b)(2) to 26(b)(1). Indeed, the initial report to the Chief Justice about the 2010
Duke Conference recounted that there was “no demand . . . for a change” to
Rule 26(b)(1).145 It would be a mistake, however, to read the mere
transplantation of the proportionality factors from one subsection of Rule 26(b)
to another subsection of Rule 26(b) as compelling—or even suggesting—a more
restrictive approach. Having these factors appear in a different subsection of the
rule does not mean that courts and parties must prioritize the potential costs of
responding to discovery requests over meaningful access to the facts and
evidence necessary to assess substantive claims and defenses on their merits.
Significantly, the final committee note for the 2015 amendments omitted the
empirically unsupported suggestion in earlier committee reports that the longstanding proportionality factors were “not invoked often enough to dampen
excessive discovery demands.”146
The 2015 amendments do make some changes to the way the proportionality
factors are articulated. These changes, however, arguably encourage courts to
apply the discovery rules in ways that will facilitate, rather than undermine,
access and enforcement. For example, the text of Rule 26 now explicitly
recognizes “the parties’ relative access to information” as a factor relevant to
proportionality.147 This factor can strengthen arguments in support of discovery
in precisely those cases where discovery is most crucial—where a party needs
certain information to prove its claim or defense but that information is only in
the hands of its opponent.
Indeed, the 2015 committee note explicitly acknowledges the common
problem of “information asymmetry.”148 That is, “[o]ne party—often an
individual plaintiff—may have very little discoverable information,” while
“[t]he other party may have vast amounts of information, including information
that can be readily retrieved and information that is more difficult to retrieve.”149
As the committee note explains, “these circumstances often mean that the burden
145

2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 82, at 8.
2013 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 88, at 265. Indeed, the view expressed in earlier reports defies
common sense. If the lawyers who complained about “excessive discovery” in response to the Duke Conference
survey questions, see id., were the same ones who were “not invok[ing] Rule 26(b)(2)(C) often enough,” then it
is their advocacy on behalf of their clients—not Rule 26—that requires improvement. More likely, lawyers
complaining about excessive discovery were fully aware of Rule 26’s long-standing proportionality
considerations, but they were not uniformly successful in limiting discovery requests that they viewed as
excessive. Cf. Miller, supra note 2, at 361 (“[A]ccording to the practicing bar, . . . litigation abuse is anything
the opposing lawyer is doing.”).
147 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2015).
148 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
149 Id.
146

STEINMAN GALLEYSPROOFS3

2016]

9/26/2016 8:24 AM

THE END OF AN ERA?

31

of responding to discovery lies heavier on the party who has more information,
and properly so.”150
Likewise, the advisory committee note squarely refutes the notion that the
2015 amendment was meant to make discovery more restrictive by changing the
way courts should apply the proportionality factors. The advisory committee
note states explicitly that transplanting the proportionality factors to
Rule 26(b)(1) “does not change the existing responsibilities of the court and the
parties to consider proportionality.”151 It describes the “considerations that bear
on proportionality” as simply being “moved,” “slightly rearranged,” and simply
“restor[ed]” to Rule 26(b)(1)—where those factors had initially resided in
1983.152 It acknowledges “one addition”153 to the proportionality factors—
namely the “direction to consider the parties’ relative access to relevant
information”154—but, as discussed above, that factor strengthens the argument
that the proportionality factors should not be employed to create the sort of
“Catch-22” that effectively blocks the enforcement of substantive rights and
obligations.155
150

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added). The 2015 amendment to Rule 1 also does not modify access to discovery. As
discussed supra note 99, Rule 1 provided that the Federal Rules “should be construed and administered” to
“secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1
(2014). The 2015 amendment added that the rules should also be “employed by the court and the parties to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (2015)
(emphasis added). It might be argued that this change restricts access to discovery insofar as the court and parties
must emphasize “inexpensive[ness]” during the discovery process. But that is not what the revision actually
does, and it would be misguided for courts to impose a more restrictive approach going forward. First of all, the
committee note makes clear that the 2015 amendment to Rule 1 “does not create a new or independent source
of sanctions” and does not “abridge the scope of any other of these rules.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s
note to 2015 amendment. Rather, the note explains that the amendment is meant “to emphasize that just as the
court should construe and administer these rules to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action, so the parties share the responsibility to employ the rules in the same way.” Id. See generally
WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE, MARCUS, SPENCER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, at § 1011 (describing the history and
purpose of Rule 1).
152 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; see also supra notes 50–51 and
accompanying text (discussing the 1983 addition of the proportionality factors to Rule 26(b)(1)).
153 Id. (“The considerations that bear on proportionality are moved from present Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii),
slightly rearranged and with one addition.” (emphasis added)).
154 Id.
155 The committee note also states that moving the proportionality factors to Rule 26(b)(1) “reinforces the
Rule 26(g) obligation of the parties to consider these factors in making discovery requests, responses, or
objections.” Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii) (“By signing, an attorney or party certifies that to the
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry . . . with respect to a
discovery request, response, or objection, it is . . . neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive,
considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of
the issues at stake in the action.”). The 2015 committee note does not explain how relocating the proportionality
151
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One concern that had been expressed during the comment period was that
moving the proportionality factors to Rule 26(b)(1) would change the burdens
placed on each party when a discovery dispute arises, increasing the obligations
on the party requesting discovery to justify that request in light of the
proportionality considerations.156 But there is absolutely nothing in the text or
the notes to suggest that. To the contrary, the advisory committee note
recognizes that the amended rule does not “permit the opposing party to refuse
discovery simply by making a boilerplate objection that it is not proportional.”157
If the 2015 amendment had shifted the burden, then such a boilerplate objection
would be sufficient, unless the requesting party was able to prove that its request
was proportional.
In fact, the committee note to Rule 26 anticipates a suitably pragmatic
approach to resolving discovery disputes. It explains: “The parties and the court
have a collective responsibility to consider the proportionality of all discovery
and consider it in resolving discovery disputes.”158 With respect to such disputes,
“the parties’ responsibilities would remain as they have been since 1983.”159 As
a structural matter, the process for invoking and litigating objections based on
proportionality remains identical before and after the 2015 amendments.
Regardless of where the proportionality factors are located within Rule 26(b),
the responding party must make an objection, the parties must confer,160 and
then the responding party will decide whether to provide the requested
discovery. If it does not, the requesting party may file a motion to compel and,

considerations from Rule 26(b)(2) to Rule 26(b)(1) “reinforces” that obligation, but it certainly does not suggest
that the obligation is stricter or more onerous that it had been prior to 2015.
156 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 113, at 11–12, 16; Hershkoff, Hoffman, Reinert, Schneider, Shapiro &
Steinman Comment, supra note 113, at 9–11 (noting the “danger that the rewritten rule would be misinterpreted
to place the burden on the discovering party, in every instance, to satisfy each item on the (b)(2)(C)(iii) laundry
list in order to demonstrate discoverability”).
157 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
158 Id. Further illustrating this pragmatic approach, the 2015 advisory committee note states:
A party claiming undue burden or expense ordinarily has far better information—perhaps the only
information—with respect to that part of the determination. A party claiming that a request is
important to resolve the issues should be able to explain the ways in which the underlying
information bears on the issues as that party understands them. The court’s responsibility, using all
the information provided by the parties, is to consider these and all the other factors in reaching a
case-specific determination of the appropriate scope of discovery.
Id.
159
160

Id.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1) (2015).
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ultimately, the court will decide how to apply the proportionality factors to that
particular request.161
B. Admissibility and Discovery
A second change to Rule 26(b) was to eliminate the sentence, “Relevant
information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”162 In its
place, the amended version states: “Information within this scope of discovery
need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.”163
Echoing a concern expressed in connection with the 2000 amendments to
Rule 26, the 2015 committee note states that “use of the ‘reasonably calculated’
phrase to define the scope of discovery ‘might swallow any other limitation on
the scope of discovery.’”164 The 2000 amendment had sought to clarify this point
by stressing that “[r]elevant information need not be admissible at trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence,”165 but the 2015 committee asserted that “the ‘reasonably calculated’
phrase has continued to create problems.”166
It is hard to tell, however, what sort of “problems” this phrase had created.
Minutes of a 2013 advisory committee meeting referred to “[p]reliminary
research” that had identified “hundreds if not thousands of cases that explore
this phrase” and expressed concern that “many” of these cases “seem to show
that courts also think it defines the scope of discovery.”167 But there was no
indication that any such cases had permitted discovery into matters that were not
“relevant.”168
161

See id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014).
163 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2015).
164 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
165 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014) (emphasis added); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note
to 2000 amendment (“[T]his sentence has been amended to clarify that information must be relevant to be
discoverable, even though inadmissible, and that discovery of such material is permitted if reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”).
166 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
167 See Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Civil Rules Advisory Committee Minutes 9 (April 11–12, 2013),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee-rules-civil-procedureapril-2013.
168 See Hershkoff, Hoffman, Reinert, Schneider, Shapiro & Steinman Comment, supra note 113, at 8 n.22.
Indeed, information that is “reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence” would seem quite naturally to
be “relevant to the claims and defenses” and hence a proper subject of pretrial discovery. Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, evidence is only admissible if it is relevant. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (“Relevant evidence is
162
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While the lack of a convincing justification for this change is frustrating, the
new language does not imply a more restrictive approach to the scope of
discovery. Both before and after the 2015 amendments, nonprivileged material
that is relevant to the claims or defenses is discoverable, subject to the
proportionality factors that have been part of the rules since 1983, regardless of
whether the material itself would be admissible at trial. Eliminating the phrase
“reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence” does not restrict what is
already a broad “relevance” standard. It has long been recognized that matters
“relevant to the claims or defenses” include “[a] variety of types of information
not directly pertinent to the incident in suit”—such as “other incidents of the
same type,” “organizational arrangements or filing systems,” and “information
that could be used to impeach a likely witness.”169 And as to the relationship
between the scope of discovery and admissibility, the new language states that
“[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence
to be discoverable.”170
Accordingly, there is no reason to read the 2015 amendment’s elimination
of the “reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence” language as
constricting the scope of discovery. In many respects, this aspect of the 2015
amendment parallels the revisions regarding the proportionality factors
discussed above. As to both issues, there was an empirically unsupported
perception that parts of Rule 26 were not being followed. As to both issues, a
similarly unsupported perception had prompted an earlier amendment in 2000.
As to both issues, the 2015 amendment sought to clarify yet again an aspect of
Rule 26 that did not actually need further clarification. And as to both issues, the

admissible . . . . Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.”). Information that is “reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence” is, by necessity, reasonably calculated to lead to relevant evidence. See
Hershkoff, Hoffman, Reinert, Schneider, Shapiro & Steinman Comment, supra note 113, at 8. Given that any
such discovery would be subject to proportionality limitations (both before and after the 2015 amendments), it
is unclear why the prospect of discovery into information that is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence” would be viewed as problematic. See id.
169 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. The advisory committee explained:
[O]ther incidents of the same type, or involving the same product, could be properly discoverable
under the [relevant to the claims or defenses] standard. Information about organizational
arrangements or filing systems of a party could be discoverable if likely to yield or lead to the
discovery of admissible information. Similarly, information that could be used to impeach a likely
witness, although not otherwise relevant to the claims or defenses, might be properly discoverable.
In each instance, the determination whether such information is discoverable because it is relevant
to the claims or defenses depends on the circumstances of the pending action.
Id.
170

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2015).
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2015 amendments did not ultimately change the standards by which courts
should assess whether any given discovery request is proper under the rules.
C. Eliminating Discovery’s “Second Tier”
As explained above, the 2015 amendments eliminated what had come to be
known as the “second tier” of discovery, which had previously allowed courts—
if good cause was shown—to allow discovery into a matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action, even if it was not relevant to any party’s
claim or defense. Discovery remains available—without any prior court
authorization—into all matters relevant to any party’s claim or defense.
So what exactly is the impact of removing a court’s discretionary authority
to permit discovery into matters beyond what was relevant to the claims or
defenses but within what is relevant to the “subject matter involved”?171 This
change is admittedly a puzzling one: a classic example of a solution in search of
a problem. Indeed, the advisory committee note explaining this change did not
even suggest that court-ordered, good-cause, second-tier discovery was being
misused; in fact it stated that “[t]he Committee has been informed that this
language is rarely invoked.”172 Neither the committee note itself nor any of the
materials and reports leading up to the 2015 amendment cites a single example
where courts or parties invoked this provision in a problematic way. Combined
with the Duke Conference report that showed there was “no demand . . . for a
change” to Rule 26(b)(1),173 it is hard to fathom why eliminating this provision
was justified.
As with other changes to Rule 26(b)(1), however, it would be a mistake to
view this change as limiting access to discovery in a significant way. Most
importantly, the first tier of discovery (now the only tier) regarding matters that
are “relevant to any party’s claim or defense” is still quite expansive. Again, this
was explicitly recognized in the advisory committee note to the 2000
amendments, which explained that a variety of information could be “relevant”
to the claims or defenses even if not directly related to the incident in question.174
The 2015 advisory committee note confirmed this, citing the 2000 note and
observing that discovery would remain available—without prior court order—

171
172
173
174

text.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
Id.
2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 82, at 8.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment; see supra note 169 and accompanying
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into “other incidents of the same type, or involving the same product;
information about organizational arrangements or filing systems; and
information that could be used to impeach a likely witness.”175
Given the breadth of discovery available under the “first tier,” there are
few—if any—cases where a lack of “second tier” discovery is likely to be
harmful. Indeed, courts finding “good cause” for discovery into matters relevant
to “the subject matter involved in the action” had often concluded that the same
discovery requests were relevant to the party’s claims or defenses; that is, the
court invoked the second tier solely as an alternative justification.176
If there is a genuine concern regarding the loss of the second tier it is this: It
could be harder for parties to use the discovery process to find information to
support claims or defenses that are related to the general “subject matter” of the
action but that they have not yet asserted. The drafters of the 2000 amendments
recognized this explicitly. By requiring a finding of good cause in order to
engage in “subject matter” discovery, the 2000 amendments “signal[ed] to the
parties that they have no entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or
defenses that are not already identified in the pleadings.”177
In many cases, of course, information supporting new claims or defenses will
also be relevant to the already-asserted claims or defenses and therefore could
have been—and will continue to be—discoverable without a specific finding of
good cause.178 But even when there is some matter that would be relevant to the
“subject matter involved in the action” but not to “any party’s claim or defense,”
175 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (internal quotations omitted); see also
id. (“Such discovery is not foreclosed by the amendments.”).
176 See, e.g., Janis v. Nelson, No. CR. 09-5019-KES, 2009 WL 5216898, at *4–5 (D.S.D. Dec. 30, 2009)
(“This information is relevant to plaintiffs’ claim that defendants’ practice or procedure with regard to the voter
registration lists and provisional ballots must be precleared pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. . . .
Even if these discovery requests seek information beyond plaintiffs’ claims, such information is relevant to the
subject matter of this case and good cause exists for allowing the discovery.”).
177 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (emphasis added); see also Hill v.
Motel 6, 205 F.R.D. 490, 493 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (noting that under the 2000 amendment’s two-tier approach,
“Plaintiff has no entitlement to discover all Area Managers’ personnel files in the hope of developing a new agediscrimination claim based on a theory of discriminatory impact” because “[t]his case has been from the outset
a discriminatory-treatment case—a discrete dispute over Defendants’ motives for the single decision to terminate
Plaintiff’s employment, rather than a more expansive challenge to Defendants’ company-wide policies or
practices”); WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE, MARCUS, SPENCER & STEINMAN, supra note 1, at § 2008 (“It is at this
point where a new claim or defense is the focus of discovery not relevant to the current ones that calls for a
determination whether to allow discovery that goes to the subject matter limit.”).
178 See, e.g., Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Kremers Urban Dev., No. Civ. A. 02-1628 GMS, 2003 WL 22711586,
at *2, *5 (D. Del. Nov. 14, 2003) (allowing the amendment of complaint to add new claims based on information
obtained during discovery).
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a party could seek to add the new claims about which he or she hopes to obtain
discovery.179 A party might need permission from the court to amend its
pleading to add such claims.180 But the party would have needed permission
anyway to obtain “subject matter” discovery prior to the 2015 amendments.
This does not excuse the frustrating lack of any persuasive justification for
eliminating the second tier. The documentation supporting the amendments
provided no support whatsoever for the notion that good cause discovery into
matters relevant to the “subject matter involved in the action”—but not to “any
party’s claim or defense”—had been used improperly. But getting rid of that
second tier is not likely to constrain access to discovery in a significant way.
D. Deleting Examples of Relevant Matter
Prior to the 2015 amendments, Rule 26(b)(1) provided that “[p]arties may
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party’s claim or defense—including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter.”181 The
new amendments delete the italicized language, which means that the text of
Rule 26(b)(1) no longer clarifies explicitly that matter “relevant to any party’s
claim or defense” includes “the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter.”182
Like the other amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) described earlier, this change
cannot sensibly be understood to restrict the availability of discovery. The
advisory committee note to the 2015 amendments says this with unmistakable
clarity, explaining that “[d]iscovery of such matters is so deeply entrenched in
practice that it is no longer necessary to clutter the long text of Rule 26 with
these examples,”183 and that “[t]he discovery identified in these examples should
still be permitted under the revised rule when relevant and proportional to the
179 See, e.g., McGrath v. Everest Nat. Ins. Co., No. 2:07 cv 34, 2009 WL 1325405, at *1–2 (N.D. Ind. May
13, 2009), amended on other grounds, 2009 WL 2508216 (N.D. Ind. May 13, 2009) (recognizing that discovery
was relevant to the parties’ claims or defenses in light of new claims added in an amended complaint); see also
Hill, 205 F.R.D. at 493 (recognizing that if the plaintiff had asserted a discriminatory impact claim from the
beginning, there would have been no need to obtain good cause to allow second-tier discovery).
180 See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)–(2) (2015) (describing when the court’s leave is required to amend a
pleading).
181 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014) (emphasis added).
182 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
183 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (emphasis added).
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needs of the case.”184 This is consistent with earlier committee notes, which
likewise instruct that “[i]nformation about organizational arrangements or filing
systems of a party could be discoverable if likely to yield or lead to the discovery
of admissible information.”185
Moreover, it is clear from the text of the pre-2015 rule that “the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know of any
discoverable matter” were “includ[ed]” in what constitutes “matter that is
relevant to any party’s claims or defense.”186 Thus, the elimination of that list
does not reduce the scope of discoverable matter. It simply removed from the
text some illustrative examples of discoverable matter—the discoverability of
which “is so deeply entrenched in practice that it is no longer necessary to clutter
the long text of Rule 26.”187 Thus, as a matter of textual logic—bolstered by the
clarification provided in the 2015 committee note—it would be irresponsible for
judges to interpret this change as mandating a more restrictive approach.
E. Protective Orders and Cost-Shifting
The 2015 amendments also revised Rule 26(c), which governs protective
orders. Even before the 2015 amendments, Rule 26(c) provided that upon a
showing of “good cause,” the court may “protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” by
“issu[ing] an order . . . specifying terms for . . . the disclosure or discovery.”188
The 2015 amendments clarified that the “terms” a court might “specify[]” in
order to “protect a party or person from . . . undue burden or expense” include
the “allocation of expenses.”189
Who bears the cost of discovery is very important when it comes to
meaningful access to justice. In most cases, as described above, discovery plays
its most significant role when the defendant possesses the information relevant
to its liability, and the plaintiff cannot obtain that information without recourse
to court-supervised discovery.190 Shifting the cost of producing that information

184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id. (emphasis added).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014) (emphasis added).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B) (2014).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B) (2015).
See supra note 147–50 and accompanying text.
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to the requesting plaintiff can, in some circumstances, make it economically
impossible to pursue meritorious claims.191
The question going forward is this: Do the 2015 amendments actually
expand a court’s ability to shift the costs of discovery pursuant to Rule 26(c)? It
does not. As a textual matter, it would be hard to contend that the pre-2015
authority to “specify [the] terms . . . for . . . discovery” could not include the
authority to allocate expenses.192 In cases where discovery truly would create
“undue burden or expense,” an order “specifying” that costs be shared would
seem to be an especially well-tailored device for mitigating that burden or
expense.
Accordingly, the real issue is—and always has been—when would the
burden or expense of discovery be so “undue” that cost-shifting or some other
protective order is justified. The 2015 amendments to Rule 26(c) do not purport
to address that question, and the committee note confirms that the change does
not overhaul the general rule that each party bears its own expenses during the
discovery process. The note states explicitly that the 2015 amendment “does not
imply that cost-shifting should become a common practice” and that “[c]ourts
and parties should continue to assume that a responding party ordinarily bears
the costs of responding.”193
The structure of Rule 26 indicates that a discovery request should not be
deemed to create “undue burden or expense” for purposes of Rule 26(c) if it
satisfies the “proportionality” inquiry for purposes of Rule 26(b) (whether under
the pre-2015 Rule 26(b)(2) or the post-2015 Rule 26(b)(1)). If the court finds
that a discovery request is “proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
191 See, e.g., Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(noting that cost-shifting “places a price on justice that will not always be acceptable: it would result in the
abandonment of meritorious claims by litigants too poor to pay for necessary discovery”); see also Sellers, supra
note 113, at 10 (“While cost-shifting may be appropriate in limited circumstances, it is unwarranted and
inefficient in most, and could have the effect of denying discovery altogether in civil rights and employment
cases where plaintiffs have limited resources to bear such costs.” (footnote omitted)); Thornburg, supra note
113, at 7 (arguing that “the explicit approval of cost shifting” in Rule 26(c) “threatens the ability of underresourced litigants to discover important information”).
192 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“Authority to enter such orders is
included in the present rule, and courts already exercise this authority. Explicit recognition will forestall the
temptation some parties may feel to contest this authority.”).
193 Id.
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expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,”194 then the court
has necessarily found that the “burden or expense” of that request is not
“undue.”195
It follows that a court’s ability to issue an “order to protect a party” from
such “undue burden or expense” by “specifying . . . the allocation of expenses”
comes into play only when the court would otherwise refuse discovery entirely
because of the proportionality factors. Understood correctly, then, these
protective orders can only expand the ability of requesting parties to uncover
relevant information. If the burden of producing relevant information is not
undue, then there is no justification for issuing a cost-shifting protective order
under Rule 26(c)—and no justification for refusing discovery on proportionality
grounds (either before or after the 2015 amendments). But if the burden of
producing relevant information is undue, then there would be grounds for
refusing discovery entirely (because of the proportionality factors), and
Rule 26(c) would give a court the ability to order discovery on the condition that
the requesting party bear some portion of the production expenses.
Accordingly, this change to the protective-order provision of Rule 26 does
not expand the power of courts to shift costs. To the contrary, it simply confirms
a court’s ability to allow discovery that it would otherwise deem to create
impermissible burden or expense, on the condition that the requesting party
bears some or all of the costs of production.
F. Elimination of the Pleading Forms
While most of the 2015 amendments focus on the discovery process, one
aspect of the recent amendments elicited strong criticism because of its potential
impact on pleading standards. As discussed above, the 2015 amendments
eliminated all but two of the forms that had previously appeared in the appendix
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.196 Among the forms that were
eliminated were iconic pleading forms, which had long stood as exemplars of
the lenient approach to pleading that the drafters of the original rules
envisioned.197

194
195
196
197

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2015).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (2015).
See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
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Many surmised that the real motivation behind abrogating the forms was to
implement a more restrictive approach to pleading standards.198 As long as those
pleading forms remained in the rules’ appendix—accompanied by Rule 84’s
instruction that those forms “suffice under these rules and illustrate the
simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate”199—it would be difficult for
federal courts to insist that a plaintiff’s complaint contain the sort of factual
detail and evidentiary support that proponents of heightened pleading standards
would prefer. At the very least, eliminating the forms created a risk that lower
courts would impose an undesirably strict approach.200
Whatever the initial motivations may have been behind the proposal to
abrogate the forms, the 2015 amendments cannot fairly be read as an invitation
to make pleading standards more restrictive. Most significantly, the advisory
committee note states explicitly that the elimination of the forms “does not alter
existing pleading standards or otherwise change the requirements of Civil
Rule 8.”201 Rather, the forms that were eliminated “are no longer necessary”
because “[t]he purpose of providing illustrations for the rules, although useful
when the rules were adopted, has been fulfilled.”202
These premises directly and forcefully refute the notion that federal courts
should view the elimination of the forms as enshrining a heightened pleading
standard along the lines of some interpretations of Twombly and Iqbal.203 As an
interpretive matter, it would be nonsensical to use the fact that the forms’
“purpose” has been “fulfilled” as justification for an approach to pleading that
flies in the face of those same forms. It follows that the pleading forms that had
long occupied the appendix to the Federal Rules—and that the original rules’
drafters believed were crucial illustrations of the way the rules were meant to
operate204—should remain relevant. Given the explicit instruction in the
committee note and the fact that no amendments were made to the rules that
govern pleading and pleading motions (such as Rule 8 and Rule 12), pleading

198 See, e.g., Hershkoff, Hoffman, Reinert, Schneider, Shapiro & Steinman Comment, supra note 113, at
16–17; Siegel et al., supra note 113, at 1–2.
199 FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (2014) (abrogated 2015).
200 Hershkoff, Hoffman, Reinert, Schneider, Shapiro & Steinman Comment, supra note 113, at 15
(“Twombly and Iqbal create tension with the Forms—but that tension is not insurmountable and, even if it were,
one still needs a rationale for choosing one over the other. The Committee has provided no explanation for opting
to abandon the Forms rather than to reexamine plausibility pleading.”).
201 FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
202 Id.
203 See Steinman, supra note 19, at 361–62 & n.163.
204 See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.

STEINMAN GALLEYSPROOFS3

42

9/26/2016 8:24 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1

forms that occupied the Federal Rules for its first eight decades are still the best
indicators of the federal pleading standard.
This is not to defend the decision to eliminate the forms. But it would be a
mistake to read this aspect of the 2015 amendments as tacitly approving a
restrictive approach to pleading. Those concerned about meaningful judicial
access and enforcement should resist that view, lest proponents of a more
restrictive pleading standard be granted a victory that they did not actually obtain
through the amendment process.
G. A Few Words on Interpretive Methodology
The general topic of how to interpret the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
has garnered some scholarly attention,205 although not nearly the amount of
scrutiny directed at statutory or constitutional interpretation.206 Scholars have
examined—among other things—the force of the advisory committee notes in
interpreting the rules,207 the contrast between interpreting the rules
formalistically as opposed to pragmatically or with reference to policy
considerations,208 and the unusual dual role the Supreme Court plays as both
adopter and interpreter of the rules and their amendments.209
It is beyond the scope of this Article to propose a comprehensive interpretive
theory for the Federal Rules. Insofar as many of the arguments set out above rely
on the advisory committee notes that accompany the 2015 amendments, such

205 See generally, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme Court’s
Role As Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 720 (1988); David Marcus,
Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927;
Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1993); Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil
Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188 (2012); Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism
Rules, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 123 (2015); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099 (2002).
206 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation Methodology as “Law”: Oregon’s Path-Breaking
Interpretive Framework and Its Lessons for the Nation, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 539, 541 (2011) (noting “the
forests that have been laid waste in service of three decades’ worth of academic and judicial discourse about
federal statutory interpretation”).
207 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 205, at 965–67; Struve, supra note 205, at 1152–69.
208 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 205, at 1040 (contrasting a literalist or plain meaning approach with a more
activist one); Porter, supra note 205, at 131–42 (contrasting a statutory mode of interpretation with a managerial
mode).
209 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 205, at 942–50; Moore, supra note 205, at 1061–72; Mulligan &
Staszewski, supra note 205, at 1194–1202; Porter, supra note 205, at 144–48; Struve, supra note 205, at 1119–
41.
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reliance has been common practice in the Supreme Court210 and throughout the
federal judiciary211 when it comes to interpreting the rules. Justice Scalia was
known for objecting to the use of the advisory committee notes,212 but he was a
lone exception in this regard.213 In any event, the arguments above are also
supported by the text and structure of the 2015 Federal Rules independent of the
accompanying advisory committee notes.
Admittedly, there are examples of courts using a policy-driven methodology
when interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.214 And one can certainly
imagine some judges interpreting the 2015 amendments to impose more
restrictive approaches to pleading and discovery by embracing the sort of policy
arguments (notwithstanding their lack of empirical foundation) that are often
advanced by those who support limiting private enforcement and access to
courts. It is hotly contested, however, whether a court’s policy preferences—
even the Supreme Court’s policy preferences—justify disregarding an
interpretation that is supported by the text and advisory committee notes.215
Indeed, if one was truly to embrace the view that policy concerns trump the
rules’ text, structure, and supporting advisory committee notes, then the 2015

210 See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837 (2015); Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v.
Cent. Pension Fund of Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs & Participating Emp’rs, 134 S. Ct. 773, 781 (2014);
Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195 (2013); Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A.,
560 U.S. 538, 550 (2010); Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 764–65 (2001); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August,
450 U.S. 346, 356 (1981).
211 See, e.g., In re Nat. Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 775 F.3d 570, 578–79, 581, 587
(3d Cir. 2014); Republic of Ecuador v. Mackay, 742 F.3d 860, 866–70 (9th Cir. 2014); Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d
1306, 1311–15 (11th Cir. 2010).
212 See, e.g., Krupski, 560 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring).
213 See supra note 210.
214 See, e.g., Porter, supra note 205, at 136–42 (describing a “managerial mode” of interpretation where the
Court “strategiz[es] and innovat[es] to achieve normative goals”); see also Marcus, supra note 205, at 973
(describing the Twombly decision as “based . . . on policy concerns” rather than any “attempt to unpack rule text
or unearth rule maker intent or purpose”); Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 205, at 1196 (“[C]ommentators
almost universally recognized Twombly and Iqbal as statements regarding the policy underlying pleading
requirements . . . not the legalistic interpretation of Rule 8.”).
215 See, e.g., Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 205, at 1223–24 (arguing that when an interpretation of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure involves policy choices, “the Court should refer the issue for resolution
pursuant to the court rulemaking process, rather than resolving the issue pursuant to adjudication”); Struve, supra
note 205, at 1119–20 (noting that both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have “felt free to strain the
Rules’ text, and ignore relevant Notes, in order to implement their own views of desirable policy” and arguing
“that such an approach enlarges the powers of the courts beyond their proper boundaries”). But see Moore, supra
note 205, at 1085 (“[T]he Court has a clear duty to determine, within the framework of the particular Rule and
the Federal Rules as a whole, how best to effectuate the various and sometimes competing policy interests
involved.”); id. at 1093 (“[A] more activist role in the interpretative stage, one that considers purpose and policy,
is appropriate.”).
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amendments themselves are completely irrelevant; a court could impose more
restrictive standards even if the rules had not been amended at all.
In any event, there are strong disagreements over whether restrictive
approaches to pleading or discovery are, in fact, desirable from a policy
standpoint. So it certainly cannot be said that a pragmatic or policy-driven
interpretive methodology would require courts to read the 2015 amendments as
imposing more restrictive standards. Of course it is always possible that
individual judges will privilege their own policy preferences over other
considerations when applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But the key
point here is that no interpretive methodology would compel courts to heighten
pleading standards or to limit access to discovery in the wake of the 2015
amendments. And for all the reasons described above, there are strong
arguments against such an interpretation.
IV. BEYOND THE 2015 AMENDMENTS: LESSONS AND CHALLENGES
Part III shows that the 2015 amendments, properly understood, did not make
meaningful changes to either the pleading standard or the basic framework and
principles governing access to discovery. This is encouraging news for those
who were concerned that the amendments would disrupt the simplified, meritsdriven approach to these issues that the drafters of the original Federal Rules put
into place nearly eight decades ago. But it also highlights a number of important
lessons and challenges.
The 2015 amendments confirm the view that the rules amendment process is
unlikely to make significant changes regarding the procedural issues that are so
crucial for access to justice and the judicial enforcement of substantive law. This
means that the key battleground will be the federal courts themselves, as
individual judges in individual cases are called upon to interpret and apply the
federal rules. Therefore, special attention must be paid to post-adoption
developments that are likely to influence those judges. This Part concludes by
addressing recent moves by Chief Justice Roberts that seek to spin the 2015
amendments as changing more than they actually do.
A. Civil Procedure’s Post-Legislative Era
At first glance, it may seem quite surprising that the 2015 amendments did
not lead to more sweeping changes. As described above, many who were
involved in the rulemaking process appeared to embrace the empirically
unsupported premise that federal litigation was plagued by unjustifiably high
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discovery costs, and the chairs and members of the key rulemaking committees
came disproportionately from one side of the ideological spectrum.216
Everything seemed to be teed up perfectly for those wishing to restrict access
and enforcement to make major legislative changes to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Yet the fruits of those efforts—the amendments themselves—failed
to do so.
There are a number of institutional explanations for this result. As Steve
Burbank and Sean Farhang have explained, a variety of factors have conspired
to make it very difficult to bring about significant positive-law changes to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—whether through congressional legislation or
through the rules amendment process.217 With respect to Congress, divided
government has made major procedural legislation virtually impossible.218
While restrictive reforms have been a high priority for Republican lawmakers
for decades, their legislative efforts have done little more than “nibble[] around
the edges of the litigation state.”219 And with respect to amending the Federal
Rules via the Rules Enabling Act, changes to the amendment process enacted in
1988 “made it more difficult to use the rulemaking process for major civil
litigation reform.”220 The 2015 amendments’ most significant lesson, therefore,
may be to mark even more clearly the end of the period when positive,

216

See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.
See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 2, at 1562–68, 1580–82.
218 See id. at 1567; see also id. at 1545 (“So long as Democrats controlled at least one chamber of Congress,
Republicans’ litigation reform proposals had little chance of success. Even when Republicans secured control
of both chambers (and for a time concurrently held the presidency), their litigation reform successes were modest
and clustered in a few discrete policy areas.”).
219 Id. at 1564. The most recent piece of successful legislation was the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
the most significant consequence of which was to expand federal subject-matter jurisdiction over high-stakes
class actions that otherwise might have proceeded only in state court. See generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The
Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1823, 1856–61 (2008) (discussing the expansion of diversity jurisdiction by the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005); Sherman, supra note 12, at 1596–1605 (discussing the various exceptions to the expansion of diversity
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act). During the past decade, ambitious attempts at restrictive
legislation have failed. See, e.g., Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2015, H.R. 1927, 114th Cong. (Apr.
22, 2015); Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2011, H.R. 966, 112th Cong. (Mar. 9, 2011); Small Business Growth
Act of 2007, H.R. 1012, 110th Cong. (Feb. 13, 2007).
220 Burbank & Farhang, supra note 2, at 1546; see also id. at 1601 (“[T]he 1988 reforms assimilated the
formal characteristics of the rulemaking process to those of the administrative process, and brought the landscape
of rulemaking closer to that of the legislative process more generally. In combination with other influences
promoting institutional self-restraint, their effect was to entrench the status quo and to render consequential
reform by Federal Rule more difficult . . . .”).
217

STEINMAN GALLEYSPROOFS3

46

9/26/2016 8:24 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1

prospective lawmaking was a driving force in the content of federal civil
procedure.221
The key question going forward is who, if anyone, will fill the lawmaking
void. One possibility is the Supreme Court itself—not by adopting positive-law
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through the Rules Enabling
Act process, but rather by issuing precedential decisions in individual cases.222
And indeed, recent years have witnessed several controversial Supreme Court
decisions—on a variety of important issues—that appear to push federal civil
procedure in a more restrictive direction.223
With respect to pleading standards and discovery, however, it is not clear
that the Supreme Court is likely to drive procedural reform through the stare
decisis effect of its decisions in individual cases. When a district court decides a
discovery motion—which would be the vehicle for applying Rule 26(b)’s
proportionality considerations, for example—principles of appellate jurisdiction
usually insulate that ruling from immediate appellate review.224 This makes
Supreme Court review of discovery issues quite rare. Pleading standards (which
are more easily reviewed on appeal) might seem more susceptible to Supreme
Court meddling. That was precisely why the Court’s decisions in Twombly and
Iqbal elicited such strong criticism. In terms of stare decisis, however, it is far

221

Ongoing rulemaking activity regarding class actions provides further support for this point. Although
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee created a “Rule 23 Subcommittee” to explore possible amendments to
Rule 23, it placed more controversial amendments on hold, declining to include them in proposed amendments
that were circulated for public comment in August 2016. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, APRIL 2016
CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE AGENDA BOOK 107–12 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/rulespolicies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rules-civil-procedure-april-2016 (indicating that possible
amendments regarding “pick-off issues” and “ascertainability” had been put “on hold”). There remains, of
course, considerable debate over whether the Rules Enabling Act process—as presently constituted—is a
desirable method of generating and amending procedural rules. See, e.g., Lesnik, supra note 123, at 582 (“The
assignment of a rule-promulgating role to the Supreme Court is unwise and inappropriate and should be reexamined.”); Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 229,
231, 237 (critiquing the fact that the current rulemaking process is “dominated by judges,” as well as the
“diffusion of responsibility” that stems from the fact that “so many people and so many layers are involved in
[the] rulemaking [process]”). For a general discussion of debates surrounding the Rules Enabling Act process,
see OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: AN INTRODUCTION TO
PROCEDURE 1162–94 (2003).
222 See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 2, at 1580–82 (arguing that the conservative Supreme Court was in
a better position than the Republicans in the political branches to restrict private access to judicial remedies).
223 See supra note 15.
224 See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108 (2009) (“[W]e have generally denied
review of pretrial discovery orders.” (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377
(1981))).
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from clear that those decisions mandate a stricter approach to pleading.225
Indeed, more recent Supreme Court decisions on pleading standards confirm that
Twombly and Iqbal, properly understood, reaffirm basic aspects of notice
pleading.226
While there may be disagreement about the correct interpretation of
Twombly and Iqbal in terms of their prospective lawmaking content,227 the
aftermath of Twombly and Iqbal is worth keeping in mind as courts and
commentators consider and respond to the 2015 amendments. Twombly and
Iqbal were problematic decisions to be sure,228 and critics raised legitimate
questions about where the Court’s reasoning might lead. Many who favored the
simplified, merits-driven approach contemplated by the initial drafters of the
Federal Rules condemned Twombly and Iqbal on the grounds that those
decisions imposed a more restrictive pleading standard. And many who favored
a more restrictive standard were perfectly happy to use Twombly and Iqbal to
accomplish that result. Because of this dynamic, the focus of the debate was not
on whether those decisions should be read to disrupt a half-century’s worth of
notice pleading, but rather on whether that change was normatively desirable.229
Like Twombly and Iqbal, the 2015 amendments and the process that led to
them are troubling in many respects. But it does not follow that the best
interpretation of those amendments is one that would require judges to reduce
access to discovery and to heighten pleading standards. Judges should be
encouraged to interpret the 2015 amendments in a way that allows meaningful
access to judicial remedies and enforcement of substantive rights and
225 See Steinman, supra note 2, at 1320 (“The conventional reading of Twombly and Iqbal assumes that they
have essentially overruled pre-Twombly authorities on federal pleading standards. This view cannot withstand
close scrutiny, however.” (footnote omitted)); see also supra note 72 and accompanying text (arguing that
important parts of the Twombly and Iqbal opinions support the more lenient pleading approach envisioned by
the original rules’ drafters).
226 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. See generally Steinman, supra note 19, at 367–80 (discussing
the Supreme Court’s decisions since Iqbal).
227 See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 19, at 364–65 (contrasting “the standard critique of Twombly and Iqbal”
with a reading of those cases that would require federal courts to continue to follow pre-Twombly pleading
precedents).
228 See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 2, at 1299 (“Twombly and Iqbal appear to be result-oriented decisions
designed to terminate at the earliest possible stage lawsuits that struck the majorities as undesirable. And it was
irresponsible for the Court to invite the controversial ‘plausibility’ concept into pleading doctrine in a way that
has led to such widespread confusion.” (footnote omitted)).
229 While some federal courts understood Twombly and Iqbal to preserve the Federal Rules’ long-standing
notice-pleading approach, see supra note 21, empirical studies revealed that—at least for certain kinds of cases—
federal courts applied pleading standards more restrictively in the wake of those decisions. See supra notes 70–
71 and accompanying text.
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obligations. As explained in Part III, the text and structure of the 2015
amendments, confirmed by the advisory committee notes, should be read to
maintain rather than to restrict the rules’ long-standing approach to pleading and
discovery.
B. Post-Adoption Developments
The insights of the previous section indicate that the effect of the 2015
amendments on crucial procedural issues like pleading standards and access to
discovery will not be compelled by top-down, binding edicts (whether from
Congress, the rules amendment process, or precedential Supreme Court
decisions). Rather, a battle of persuasion in the lower courts will determine their
ultimate impact. The opening salvos in this battle have already come from Chief
Justice Roberts himself. Not even a full month after the 2015 amendments
became effective, he devoted considerable attention to them in his 2015 YearEnd Report on the Federal Judiciary.230
The Chief’s report began with a two-page introduction about a dueling
pamphlet authored in 1838 by former South Carolina governor John Lyde
Wilson.231 While the Chief called the pamphlet “a largely forgotten relic of a
happily bygone past,” he wrote that it was also “a stark reminder of
government’s responsibility to provide tribunals for the peaceful resolution of
all manner of disputes,” and opined that “civil tribunals, far more than the
inherently uncivilized dueling fields they supplanted, must be governed by
sound rules of practice and procedure.”232
Chief Justice Roberts then proceeded to heap praise on the 2015
amendments. They are a “big deal,”233 a “significant change,”234 and a “major
stride toward a better federal court system,”235 arising from “five years of intense
study, debate, and drafting to address the most serious impediments to just,
230 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 23; see also Adam Liptak, Chief Justice’s Report Praises Limits
on Litigants’ Access to Information, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/us/
politics/chief-justices-report-praises-limits-on-claimants-access-to-information.html (describing the report and
the responses of several scholars).
231 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 23, at 1–3. For additional insights on dueling practices in the early
decades of our republic, see generally Anthony Ramos, Lin-Manuel Miranda, Jon Rua & Leslie Odom, Jr.,
Original Broadway Cast of Hamilton, Ten Duel Commandments, YOUTUBE (Sept. 26, 2015), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=dS79uxNFoHw.
232 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 23, at 2–3.
233 Id. at 5 (“The amendments may not look like a big deal at first glance, but they are.”).
234 Id. (“They mark significant change, for both lawyers and judges, in the future conduct of civil trials.”).
235 Id. at 9 (“The 2015 civil rules amendments are a major stride toward a better federal court system.”).
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speedy, and efficient resolution of civil disputes.”236 He declared that the 2010
Duke Conference’s “40 papers and 25 data compilations[] confirmed that . . . in
many cases civil litigation has become too expensive, time-consuming, and
contentious, inhibiting effective access to the courts” and showed the need to
(among other things) “focus discovery . . . on what is truly necessary to resolve
the case.”237 The revised Rule 26(b)(1), he wrote, “crystalizes the concept of
reasonable limits on discovery through increased reliance on the common-sense
concept of proportionality”; “[s]pecifically, the pretrial process must provide
parties with efficient access to what is needed to prove a claim or defense, but
eliminate unnecessary or wasteful discovery.”238
With respect to the elimination of Rule 84 and the forms, Chief Justice
Roberts wrote that “many of those forms have become antiquated and
obsolete.”239 He explained that, following the abrogation of the forms, the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts had “assembled a group of experienced
judges to replace those outdated forms with modern versions that reflect current
practice and procedure.”240 The Chief Justice then directed readers to what he
called twelve “revised” pro se forms that were posted on the U.S. Courts
website.241
These new pro se forms stand in stark contrast to the forms that occupied the
rules’ appendix for decades and were deemed to “suffice under these rules and
illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”242 Form 11,
for example, had instructed that a negligence complaint would pass muster
merely by alleging: “On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor
vehicle against the plaintiff.”243 By contrast, the new Pro Se Form 5—entitled
Complaint for a Civil Case Alleging Negligence244—insists that the plaintiff
describe not only “the acts or failures to act” but also “why they were
negligent.”245 It is a laudable goal to provide resources for pro se litigants who
236

Id. at 4.
Id. at 4–5.
238 Id. at 6–7.
239 Id. at 8–9.
240 Id. at 9.
241 Id. (citing Pro Se Forms, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms (last visited
May 12, 2016)).
242 FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (2014) (abrogated 2015).
243 FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11, ¶ 2 (2014) (abrogated 2015).
244 See Complaint for a Civil Case Alleging Negligence, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/
pro-se-forms/complaint-civil-case-alleging-negligence (last visited May 12, 2016).
245 Id. To their credit, the “experienced judges” who prepared these forms for the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 23, at 9, warn that the new pro se forms do not “provide[]
237
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must navigate an increasingly complex federal judiciary, especially after the
elimination of the forms. But it is both troubling and inaccurate for the Chief
Justice to declare unilaterally in his Year-End Report that these new pro se
forms—which insist on more detail than the recently abrogated forms—“reflect
current practice and procedure.”246
Chief Justice Roberts’s recent activity is precisely what we would expect to
see in this post-legislative era. His Year-End Report and the new batch of pro se
forms are not binding law. They have not been enacted by majorities of both
houses of Congress and signed into law by the President.247 They have not been
approved by the Supreme Court pursuant to the process set forth in the Rules
Enabling Act.248 And they are not Supreme Court decisions that bind lower
courts via stare decisis.249 These maneuvers by Chief Justice Roberts are
advocacy, not law. Given current institutional realities, however, they are what
remain in the arsenal of those who seek to make judicial enforcement less
available and less effective.250
legal advice” and that “[v]ariations” are “[p]ossible.” See, e.g., Complaint for a Civil Case Alleging Negligence,
About These Forms, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms/complaint-civil-casealleging-negligence (last visited May 12, 2016). The website states:
A form may call for more or less information than a particular court requires. The fact that a form
asks for certain information does not mean that every court or a particular court requires it. And if
the form does not ask for certain information, a particular court might still require it. Consult the
rules and caselaw that govern in the court where you are filing the pleading.
Id. Descriptively, it is certainly true that “a particular court” might—correctly or not—“require[]” “more or less
information” than the pro se form indicates. As described in greater detail below, what is troubling is Chief
Justice Roberts’s suggestion in his Year-End Report that these pro se forms “reflect current practice and
procedure”—at least if one assumes that he means legally correct “practice and procedure.” See infra notes 254–
57 and accompanying text.
246 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 23, at 9.
247 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States . . . .”).
248 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074 (2012).
249 See, e.g., Steinman, To Say What the Law Is, supra note 69, at 1738 (“Because of stare decisis, a judicial
opinion creates law that can bind subsequent decision-makers just as much as a statute or constitutional
provision.”).
250 Scholars have recognized how conduct that does not directly generate binding law can nonetheless
influence judicial access and enforcement. The Chief Justice in particular has a number of such tools at his
disposal, not only his power to appoint members to the relevant rulemaking committees, see supra note 120–23
and accompanying text, but also through his authority over administrative and budgetary issues for the federal
judiciary and through his advocacy in that capacity vis-à-vis Congress, important organizations like the
American Bar Association, and even the nation as a whole. See Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a
Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1575, 1598 (2006) (“[W]hat the infrastructure of ‘administrative’ functions permits is a profoundly new
set of opportunities for the Chief Justice to shape American law through methods less visible and accessible to
law professors and the public than that of opinion writing.”); see also Judith Resnik, The Programmatic
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It is no surprise that the Chief Justice would prefer that the rules be applied
more restrictively.251 But neither he nor likeminded players in the rules
amendment process were able to make meaningful changes to the rules
themselves. Chief Justice Roberts can declare that the 2015 amendments are “a
big deal” and a “significant change” insofar as they “crystalize[] the concept of
reasonable limits on discovery through increased reliance on the common-sense
concept of proportionality.”252 As described in Section III, however, the changes
to Rule 26 suggest no such “change” or “increase[].” Considering
proportionality when evaluating discovery requests is nothing new, and the 2015
amendments do not indicate that proportionality considerations need to be
balanced in a more restrictive manner.253
Similarly misguided is the Chief Justice’s view regarding the elimination of
the pleading forms. The pro se forms that now appear on the U.S. Courts website
do not “replace” the eliminated forms. There are fundamental differences in both
their authoritativeness and their content. The rules themselves had provided that
the pleading forms in the appendix “suffice under these rules and illustrate the
simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”254 And the advisory
committee note to the 2015 amendment confirmed that the elimination of those
forms “does not alter existing pleading standards or otherwise change the
requirements of Civil Rule 8.”255 It follows that a complaint containing the same

Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269, 285
(2000) (“[T]he Chief Justice has, through institutional design, enormous influence.”). Judicial training is another
non-legislative mechanism that can impact the practical application of the rules of civil procedure. See Nancy
Gertner, Opinions I Should Have Written, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 426–28 (2016) (describing some of the
themes conveyed during judicial training sessions). Regarding the 2015 amendments specifically, some
commentators have voiced concern about training programs held by the Duke Law Center for Judicial Studies,
as well as the Duke Center’s published guidelines for implementing the amendments to Rule 26. See Brooke D.
Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); Suja A. Thomas, Opinion, Via Duke,
Companies Are Shaping Discovery, LAW360 (Nov. 4, 2015, 2:41 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
723092. Although an analysis of the Duke Center’s activities is beyond the scope of this Article, such activities
provide another example of how non-lawmaking actors and institutions may play a role in influencing how
judges interpret the 2015 amendments.
251 See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 233–38 and accompanying text.
253 See supra Section III.A.
254 FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (2014) (abrogated 2015).
255 FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; see supra notes 201–02 and
accompanying text.
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levels of “simplicity and brevity” reflected in the now-eliminated forms must
continue to suffice following the 2015 amendments.256
Therefore, it is wrong to view the 2015 amendments as a declaration that the
pleading forms in the rules’ appendix were “antiquated and obsolete” and did
not “reflect current practice and procedure.”257 Moreover, unlike the form
complaints that long appeared in the appendix, the new pro se forms do not have
any special claim to “illustrate” what the federal pleading standard requires. And
indeed, there are clear differences between the now-eliminated form complaints
and the new pro se sample complaints that Chief Justice Roberts highlighted in
his 2015 Year-End Report.258 Again, the relevant advisory committee note states
unambiguously that deleting the forms “does not alter existing pleading
standards.”259
Our system does not give the Chief Justice unilateral lawmaking authority
over pleading standards, access to discovery, or any other aspect of civil
procedure. For anyone concerned that restrictive approaches to pleading and
discovery will undermine meaningful judicial access and enforcement, the
strongest response to Chief Justice Roberts is to stress the disconnect between
the position articulated in the Year-End Report and the text, structure, and
declared purpose of the 2015 amendments themselves. The Chief Justice’s
attempt to spin the amendments as more than they actually are is a glaring
admission that the rulemaking enterprise itself failed to accomplish his hopedfor results. It is the rules themselves that bind federal courts, not the Chief
Justice’s Year-End Report.
CONCLUSION
The process that culminated in the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure was driven by a “cost-and-delay narrative”260 that put pleading
standards and access to discovery in the cross-hairs. Given the crucial role these
issues play in access to justice and the judicial enforcement of substantive rights,
the amendments merited—and received—close attention. The amendments that
were ultimately adopted, however, do not mandate a more restrictive approach
256 See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text; see also Steinman, supra note 19, at 361 n.163 (arguing
that long-standing pleading forms should continue to inform the federal pleading standard even though the
appendix of forms has been deleted).
257 See supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text.
258 See supra notes 241–45 and accompanying text.
259 FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
260 Miller, supra note 2, at 365.
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to pleading or discovery. Although there was legitimate cause for alarm given
the advisory committee’s early proposals and supporting documents, the text and
structure of the final amendments are entirely consistent with notice pleading
and a robust discovery process.
The more significant lesson of the 2015 amendments, therefore, may be that
they confirm the view that the amendment mechanism of the Rules Enabling Act
is unlikely to generate significant changes to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The process that led to the 2015 amendments was set up almost
perfectly for those who favor a more restrictive approach to make real,
detrimental changes to federal pleading and discovery standards. Yet those
efforts failed. Now, the key battleground will be the federal courts themselves,
as judges are called upon to interpret and apply the rules in particular cases.
Chief Justice Roberts has already taken various steps to spin the 2015
amendments as changing far more than they actually do. These post-amendment
moves do not change the law of civil procedure, but the Chief Justice may
ultimately win the day if he persuades lower court judges to take a more
restrictive approach. Properly interpreted, the 2015 amendments do not impose
new pleading and discovery standards. To preserve access and enforcement
going forward, it will be crucial to recognize the limited nature of the changes
made by the 2015 amendments.

